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Introduction:  
A ―Little Understood‖ Life1 
 
Chronological Overview  
 
From the latter half of the nineteenth century through the early years of the twentieth, 
Europe knew greater prosperity than any earlier era. The Industrial Revolution provided the 
means for unprecedented production and rapid distribution by railway and steamship. Great 
Britain exemplified the modern nation. The long reign of Victoria had resulted in economic 
advance and social reform. The world‘s leading manufacturer was also the world‘s banker. With 
London as the international center of banking, the gold standard of the pound sterling was the 
international standard for exchange. The ruling Liberal Party advocated morality, free trade, and 
the ideals of progressivism.
2
 The years leading up to World War I saw dramatic changes in 
Britain‘s political structure, as the House of Lords declined in power and the Irish Home Rule 
movement threatened the unity of the British Isles.
3
 Simultaneously, Britain was beginning to 
lose its economic pre-eminence to new industrial expansion in the United States and Germany. 
Following the Great War, the Liberal illusion of progress shattered in the wake of millions dead, 
ravaged territory, and economies that had borne too much. The European nations had sacrificed 
everything in an unprecedented effort to destroy each other. The newly organized League of 
                                                   
1
 Paish wrote that ―economics is a fascinating, if little understood, field of knowledge,‖ which in many 
ways applies to his own life as well. Sir George Paish, ―My Memoirs,‖ [ca. 1950-1951], COLL. MISC. 621/1 
Memoir I, Memoirs and miscellaneous papers of Sir George Paish, economist (1867-1957), British Library of 
Political & Economic Science, London School of Economics, London, United Kingdom, 2(hereafter cited as Sir 
George Paish, Memoir I).  
 
 
2
 George Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 
14. The House of Lords surrendered its right to a final veto by passing the Parliament Act of 1911.   
 
3
 Ibid., 34.  
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Nations provided a shadow of hope that the world powers might avert fighting another war, and 
instead cooperate for the benefit of the world. 
 The resulting war debt tied Europe‘s financial future with that of America, where the 
world‘s largest stockpile of gold now resided under the authority of the Federal Reserve. After 
the Great War ended, America returned to isolationist economic policy, which unbalanced the 
international economy. While Europe continued to borrow funds for rebuilding, their economies 
were slow to recover. The overextension of credit and the looming possibility that Germany 
would default on its reparations payments foretold of impending financial disaster. The stock 
market crash of 1929 plunged most of the world into economic depression during the 1930s. One 
by one, nations abandoned the gold standard for economic recovery. Under Adolf Hitler, the 
German economy expanded into an industrial war machine, surpassing the military technology 
of France and Great Britain.
4
 Italy and Japan joined Germany to conquer territory and gain 
access to their adversaries‘ economic resources. With financial and military aid from the United 
States, the Allies fought another World War which ended in German defeat after six years of 
attrition. Western Europe and the United States then banded together against the threat of the 
Soviet Union.  
 Sir George Paish (1867-1957) was a British economist who experienced these events. A 
dedicated Liberal and staunch Free-Trader, he had analyzed England‘s economy for decades. 
Paish was born into a working class family, the tenth and youngest child of Robert Paish, a 
coachman.
5
 Paish advanced from being a teenage clerk at The Statist magazine in 1881 to joint 
                                                   
4
 Niall Fergusson, The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700-2000 (New York: Basic 
Books, 2001), 42-43. 
 
5
 Roger Middleton, ―Paish, Sir George (1867-1957),‖ Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford 
University Press, 2004, available from http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/66759; Internet accessed 12 Feb 
2010. 
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editor by 1900, at the age of thirty-two. This weekly magazine was a rival to The Economist, a 
more established publication.
6
 One of Paish‘s earliest contributions to economics was his 
analysis of British railways by statistically determining load capacities and carrying efficiency. 
These studies qualified him for a position on the Board of Trade Committee, where he served 
from 1906-1908. In this position, he pushed for keeping more detailed statistics to reform 
railway companies‘ records. From 1909-1915, he was an independent consultant to David Lloyd 
George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, and who later became Prime Minister in 1916.
7
 At the 
suggestion of Lloyd George, King George V knighted Paish in 1912 for his contribution to 
economics.
8
 During World War I, Paish was an advisor and commentator on British economic 
policy until he suffered a severe mental breakdown in 1916 from overwork. He recovered before 
the war ended, and by 1917, he resumed writing memorandums and lectures on goals for the 
present crisis and future rebuilding.  
World War I transformed Britain from a creditor nation to a debtor nation.
9
 When the war 
ended, Paish hoped the League of Nations would prevent other wars and facilitate international 
economic cooperation; he was optimistic for a full and rapid recovery. However, Europe‘s 
economic situation deteriorated rapidly during the 1920s. As the situation worsened, Paish 
warned of a coming crisis and advised solutions in a series of books and articles that policy 
makers ignored or found impracticable. During the war, the Liberal party had lost control of 
                                                   
 
6
 Middleton, ―Paish.‖ 
 
 
7
 Ibid. 
 
 
8
 The Times, Friday, Jun 14, 1912; pg. 9; Issue 39925; col G. According to Paish‘s unpublished memoir, 
David Lloyd George ―suggested that I should be honoured with a knighthood and in the summer of 1911 His 
Majesty the King conferred it upon me.‖ Quoted in Avner Offer, ―Empire and Social Reform: British Overseas 
Investment and Domestic Politics, 1908-1914,‖ The Historical Journal, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Mar., 1983): 125. British 
spellings have been maintained in quotations from British sources. The fact that Paish‘s memoir was written more 
than forty years after the event explains the discrepancy of one year between the sources. 
 
 
9
 Sir George Paish, The Road to Prosperity (New York: G.P. Putnam‘s Sons, 1927), 16-17. 
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Parliament, but Lloyd George remained Prime Minister until 1922. Paish did not have much 
political clout by this time, and the Liberal decline guaranteed that ―he was never again close to 
the centre of British government or the policy debate.‖10 He retained his credibility as an 
economic expert through his writing and lecturing. He was also a member of the advisory board 
for the London School of Economics for many years. He continued to write and lecture on 
economic subjects for the next quarter century, through the end of World War II.  
 
Family Life 
 
Paish‘s family life was comfortable – the result of years of hard work. Because he left 
school to start working at twelve years of age, Paish continued his education through night 
school as a teenager.
11
  In his twenties, he taught poor children in a ―ragged school,‖ which 
provided free education to the children of the working poor. Through this charitable work, he 
met Emily Whitehead, another teacher, and ―after a long engagement‖ they married in 1894. 
Their first son, Frank, was born at their home in Croydon, a borough south of the Thames, on 
January 15, 1898. The following year, the family moved to Finchley in North London, possibly 
in conjunction with Paish‘s promotion to joint editor of The Statist.12  He shared this position 
with two other men for the next fifteen years, until he left The Statist to work in the Treasury 
following the outbreak of World War I.  
Following the end of the Boer War, Sir Edgar Vincent, an owner of The Statist, decided 
to sell his shares to the staff in 1902. Paish bought ―enough [shares] to make [his] future 
                                                   
10
 Middleton, ―Paish.‖ 
 
11
 Frank Walter Paish, War as a Temporary Occupation: First World War Memoirs of a Second Lieutenant 
(Edinburgh: Privately published, 1998), 7.   
 
12
 Ibid. 
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assured,‖ as an investment.13 By this time, he and Emily had two more sons, Donald and David, 
born in 1900 and 1902, respectively.  By late 1903, likely needing a larger house to 
accommodate their growing family, the Paish family moved to Limpsfield, near Oxted, Surrey, 
which was further south of London than Croydon. They had achieved Victorian middle class 
respectability with their house a sufficient distance from the business sector of London and three 
female servants in their employ.
14
  
As Paish‘s sons grew, he carefully arranged for them to have a more complete and formal 
education than he had. Frank recorded the succession of a governess, private tutor, and 
enrollment at Horton, a preparatory boarding school, before he turned ten. At thirteen, he entered 
Winchester College, a prestigious boys‘ school. Three of his four younger brothers also went to 
Winchester.
 
As Paish explained to Frank around 1913, ―I can either leave you boys some money 
when I die or give you a good education. Any money I leave you may be taken away by the 
Socialists, but no-one can take away an education.‖15 Although Victoria had died in 1901 and 
was succeeded by the relatively short reign of her son Edward VII, nineteenth century attitudes 
toward social and political practice remained consistent into the early years of the new century. 
Paish‘s rise from working class origins to middle class respectability encapsulated the 
progressive spirit of merit and advancement without noble birth. 
Together Paish and his wife had five sons: Frank, Donald, David, Atholl, and Harold. 
Frank served in World War I, attended Cambridge, became an economist, and later taught at the 
London School of Economics, where he donated his father‘s papers. Frank wrote a memoir of his 
war experiences, which provided insights relevant to his father‘s life as well. Donald immigrated 
                                                   
13
 Sir George Paish, Memoir I, 3. 
 
14
 Frank Paish, 7. 
 
15
 Ibid., 8.  
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to America in the 1920s, and Paish often visited Donald‘s family on his many tr ips to America. 
Donald‘s descendants have preserved a number of Paish‘s papers and correspondence from his 
visits primarily from the 1940s. Emily died of throat cancer in 1933. 
 
Historiography  
 
Paish lived through the dramatic events of the early twentieth century, so examining the 
political context provides the necessary background to understanding his life. Several histories 
emphasize the complex political atmosphere of early twentieth century Europe. Mark Mazower‘s 
Dark Continent provides a broad overview of political and economic context for this period.16 
More specific to England‘s political transitions is George Dangerfield‘s classic analysis The 
Strange Death of Liberal England. Dangerfield examined the political crises that hastened the 
demise of the Liberal party‘s aspirations, postulating that World War I acted as a catalyst that 
accelerated the party‘s downfall.17 In examining the political changes that led up to World War 
II, Ian Kershaw explains the differences between Nazism, fascism, and totalitarianism as 
political and economic systems in his work The Nazi Dictatorship.18 
While economics and politics tend to overlap, many histories focus specifically on 
European economic developments. Recently, Niall Fergusson has written broad financial 
histories that contextualize wars, finance, and the international economy covering several 
centuries, foremost among them being The Cash Nexus.  A recent collection of essays edited by 
Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison take a narrower approach, providing deeper insight into 
                                                   
16
 Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (New York: Vintage Books, 1998). 
 
17
 Dangerfield‘s book was originally published in 1935. 
 
18
 Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems& Perspectives of Interpretation, 4
th
 ed. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000).  
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The Economics of World War I. Patricia Clavin‘s work on The Great Depression in Europe, 
1929-1939 gives a brief overview of the era while examining a number of interpretations on the 
effects of the many policies implemented to deal with that crisis. Her work also has an excellent 
bibliography to direct further study. Liaquat Ahamed‘s Lords of Finance also analyzes the crises 
of the 1920s and the efforts of the leading central bankers of Britain, France, Germany, and 
America to control the market.
19
  
In addition to these histories, works that emphasize aspects of twentieth century 
economic theory provide further background for Paish‘s economic positions. Other economists 
such as Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek had similar opinions to Paish, although neither 
one cited his works. A popular introductory economic work is Friedman‘s Free to Choose, which 
lauds the supremacy of the private sector as opposed to government regulation. Friedman had 
explored many of the same ideas in an earlier, more academic work, Capitalism and Freedom.  
Hayek‘s earlier The Road to Serfdom served as a counterargument to European socialistic 
ideology of the 1940s. He similarly postulated that personal and political liberty was dependent 
on economic freedom, as opposed to centralized planning.
20
 John Kenneth Galbraith‘s 
Economics in Perspective is another useful resource on the development of economic theory and 
major changes in that field. Finally, Michael Novak‘s The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism 
                                                   
19
 See: Fergusson, The Cash Nexus; Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, eds., The Economics of World 
War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Patricia Clavin, The Great Depression in Europe, 1929-
1939 (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 2000); Liaquat Ahamed, Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World 
(New York: Penguin Press, 2009). 
 
20
 See: Milton and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose: A Personal Statement (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1979); Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Fortieth Anniversary Edition (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2002); Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, Fiftieth Anniversary Edition (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1994). 
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defends the capitalist tradition by emphasizing the Judeo-Christian moral base that led to 
economic success in England and America.
21
 
Paish was fairly well-known in his own time, as newspapers and the number of his own 
publications suggest, yet historians have only briefly mentioned him in studies focusing on 1900-
1914. The reign of Edward VII (1901-1910) has not garnered popular attention like World War I, 
the Great Depression, and World War II. Paish‘s appearance in the historical literature was 
primarily confined to his relationship with Lloyd George and debates over the accuracy of 
Paish‘s statistical estimates from years when official records on trade did not exist. Often, 
historians have cited his estimates without probing much deeper, as they were more concerned 
with statistical contributions than with Paish‘s biography.22 While the historiography of Paish‘s 
relationship with Lloyd George was not extensive, historians agree that Lloyd George relied on 
and followed Paish‘s advice for five or six years at a critical time of changing policy. Historians 
have not examined Paish‘s contributions to his field after World War I, which needed to be 
remedied.   
British historian Avner Offer examined Paish‘s collaboration with Lloyd George in 
―Empire and Social Reform: British Overseas Investment and Domestic Politics, 1908-1914,‖ 
which appeared in The Historical Journal in 1983. Offer described the economic recession in 
England in the first decade of the twentieth century, and the subsequent transfer of investments 
from domestic to international projects. Many thought these foreign investments were a form of 
                                                   
21
 See: John Kenneth Galbraith, Economics in Perspective: A Critical History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1987); Michael Novak, The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism (Lanham, Maryland: Madison Books, 1982). 
 
22
 Michael Edelstein, ―Foreign Investment, Accumulation and Empire, 1860–1914,‖ in The Cambridge 
Economic History of Modern Britain, Volume 2: Economic Maturity, 1860–1939, Eds. Roderick Floud and Paul 
Johnson, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), Cambridge Histories Online, 
http://histories.cambridge.org/uid=2451/extract?result_number=1&search_scope=book&book_id=chol97805218203
70_CHOL9780521820370&query=paish&id=chol9780521820370_CHOL9780521820370A009&advanced=0  
(accessed: April 4, 2011). 
9 
 
tax evasion and that the trend damaged domestic industry.
23
 Against these negative views, Paish 
and Sir Edgar Speyer began influencing Lloyd George‘s economic outlook. Based on Paish‘s 
memoirs, Offer thought the ―Paish-Lloyd George link was established sometime between the 
summer of 1909 . . . and the spring of 1910.‖24 One of Paish‘s most well-known studies on 
Britain‘s foreign investments appeared around this time as well. The following trade recovery 
vindicated Paish‘s views. Offer explained that ―in George Paish, Lloyd George had found an 
economist close to his own heart, an analyst whose explanations were congenial and successful 
and who gave him the confidence to defy the critics.‖25 The papers of both men support this 
conclusion. 
Michael Daunton‘s recent study of tax policy in Britain also emphasizes Paish‘s 
relationship with Lloyd George. Daunton repeats many of Offer‘s observations, but contributed 
Paish‘s views on tax policy.  In light of Britain‘s wealthy population expanding their 
international investments, Paish thought that higher taxes would not diminish their ability to 
invest. Daunton cites one of Paish‘s treasury memos, which stated, ―‗the evidence that we are 
accumulating wealth faster than we ever did before seems to me to be overwhelming, and I 
cannot but come to the conclusion that the new taxes have not had the disastrous consequences 
predicted.‘‖26 The rich had paid the higher taxes, and Paish thought statistics showed that they 
                                                   
23
 Avner Offer, ―Empire and Social Reform: British Overseas Investment and Domestic Politics, 1908-
1914,‖ The Historical Journal, 26, 1 (1983): 119, 121.  
 
24
 Ibid., 124-125. 
 
25
 Offer used Paish‘s memoirs in his research, and while these documents are an imperfect record, other 
archival sources ―confirm the general accuracy of [Paish‘s] account. Long background papers for the chancellor‘s 
speeches may be found in the treasury papers, and the communications between Lloyd George and his economic 
adviser become more frequent from 1912 onwards. A comparison of Paish‘s written advice and the chancellor‘s 
speeches shows that the journalist had become a principal influence on Lloyd George‘s economic outlook.‖ Offer, 
126. 
  
26
 Michael Daunton, Trusting Leviathan: The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1799-1914(Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 362. 
10 
 
had more money than ever. Lloyd George echoed these ideas in his Mansion House speech in 
1912.
27
 
Lloyd George‘s biographer John Grigg did not mention Paish influencing the budgets or 
tax policy, possibly because he did not know about or have access to Paish‘s papers.28 However, 
Grigg did credit Paish‘s work with Lloyd George during the crisis at the outbreak of World War 
I, stating that Paish‘s ―recommendations for dealing with the crisis were very closely 
followed.‖29 Paish left the Treasury in 1915 and suffered a mental breakdown later in 1916. 
Upon hearing of it, Lloyd George wrote Paish the same day, wishing him a speedy recovery in 
hopes that he could again give advice on policy; this letter was evidence of Lloyd George‘s 
respect for Paish‘s views and the positive nature of their relationship.30 
Two articles appeared ten years apart debating the veracity of Paish‘s statistics on 
Britain‘s international investments. In 1980, D. C. M. Platt wrote an article which argued for a 
downward revision in estimates for Britain‘s foreign investment totals. His main area of focus 
was the Victorian era, but by diminishing the estimates on investment from the nineteenth 
century, he argued that the revisions needed to extend to pre-World War I figures as well. Platt 
criticized Paish‘s estimates from a 1911 presentation at the Royal Statistical Society as 
implausible, trusting John Maynard Keynes‘ objections during the discussion of Paish‘s paper.31 
A few years later, Platt published a book which amounted to ―a major assault on the position 
                                                   
27
 Daunton, 362. 
 
28
 See John Grigg, Lloyd George: The People’s Champion, 1902-1911 (Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1978). Grigg would have researched the earlier budgets in the mid-1970s, and Offer did not publish 
his findings until 1985.  
 
29
 John Grigg, Lloyd George: From Peace to War, 1912-1916 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1985), 152. 
 
30
 Ibid., 411-412. 
 
31
 D. C. M. Platt, ―British Portfolio Investment Overseas Before 1870: Some Doubts,‖ The Economic 
History Review, Second Series, Volume 32, No. 1, (February 1980): 15. 
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established in the pioneering study by Paish,‖ and Charles Feinstein defended Paish‘s figures in a 
reply article.
32
 Feinstein read Paish‘s work more carefully than Platt, demonstrating Platt‘s 
misinterpretation of Paish‘s method. Feinstein concluded that a major part of Platt‘s case for 
revision rested on ―a false premise‖ for criticizing Paish‘s work because Platt argued that Paish‘s 
estimates had not excluded investments that foreigners bought in London, while Feinstein 
pointed out that the text of Paish‘s paper stated the opposite.33 Feinstein continued, noting Platt‘s 
lack of documentation and conceptual errors. Other studies supported Paish‘s figures, while these 
same studies brought Platt‘s revised estimates into question. Feinstein concluded that Paish‘s 
original estimates were more accurate than Platt‘s revisions.34 
 
Historical Significance and Major Themes 
 
Political and economic historians have mentioned Paish‘s relationship with Lloyd George 
and debated the accuracy of Paish‘s estimates on international investment, but no one has written 
a biography of his almost century-long life or analyzed his writing career of articles and books 
from the 1920s to the 1940s. Paish‘s influence among his contemporaries and the totality of his 
life experience provides useful insight into a period of incredible economic and political 
upheaval. His life is worthy of closer examination, if only to see Europe and America through a 
hitherto unfamiliar set of eyes. He preserved his own views in his many articles and books, in 
addition to his unpublished memoirs. Such a record provides the understanding of an inside 
observer who was not a politician or permanent civil servant, but an economist without personal 
                                                   
32
 Paish‘s estimates ―remained the standard figure for over 70 years, accepted by the Board of Trade, the 
United Nations and other governmental bodies, and by a stream of scholars,‖ including Feinstein. Charles Feinstein, 
―Britain‘s Overseas Investments in 1913,‖ The Economic History Review, Second Series, Vol. 43, No. 2 (1990): 
288.  
 
33
 Ibid., 289-291.  
 
34
Feinstein, 292-294. 
12 
 
fortune. He rubbed shoulders with policy makers without aspirations to be one of them and was 
an international observer who had a heart for his fellow man. 
In order to make sense of Paish‘s experiences, the historian must first necessarily 
reconstruct his world view based on the available documentation, which covers almost half a 
century. His economic and political views were closely connected, but the way he applied those 
views to events was entirely his own. Analyzing his positions against prevailing opinion of his 
day will illustrate the relationship between his philosophy and reality. He supported the gold 
standard, and encouraged Americans to understand its purpose. A self-proclaimed Free-Trader in 
the tradition of Adam Smith, Paish abhorred domestic socialism and international isolationism as 
detrimental to the prosperity of all people. His writings always emphasize the practical 
ramifications of policy on trade, but he did not propound new economic theories. His underlying 
theory remained consistent, but he applied his theories to world affairs and the changing roles of 
England and America in an exceedingly complex international relationship.  
A firm believer in education and hard work, Paish knew members of the privileged class, 
but was not one of them, even with his knighthood. He enjoyed the reward and virtue of work, so 
he favored employment over government assistance. Milton Friedman later summarized this 
principle as ―equality of opportunity,‖ as opposed to ―equality of outcome.‖35 Paish‘s personality 
was generally optimistic, although in the 1920s and 1930s he often warned that if the current 
economic situation continued, dire results were likely. He understood America‘s rise to 
international pre-eminence better than her own citizens, and his many trips to America may 
provide insight into Anglo-American relations in the first half of the twentieth century, as 
records exist of his meetings with Presidents Taft, Wilson, Coolidge, and Franklin Roosevelt as 
                                                   
35
 Friedman, Free to Choose, 128-140.   
13 
 
well as with numerous other officials. Unsurprisingly, a man of Paish‘s abilities and experience 
had confidence to the point of pride and an overall tenacity of purpose.  
As Paish‘s life is best understood within the historical chronology, this thesis follows 
Paish‘s life in a narrative form, exploring his activities and ideas. Chapter One covers Paish‘s 
rise to prominence in the early twentieth century: his work at The Statist, his relationship with 
Lloyd George, his activities in World War I, and his subsequent mental collapse and recovery. 
Starting from the end of the Great War, Chapter Two opens in 1918 and explores Paish‘s 
writings and travels during the 1920s, ending with the onset of the Great Depression. Chapter 
Three explains his proposals for economic recovery, more international travels, and his opinions 
during World War II.  
14 
 
Chapter 1 
―The Last Shall Be First‖:  
From Night School to Knighthood (1881-1918) 
 
On the evening of July 31, 1914, Chancellor of the Exchequer David Lloyd George was 
walking up to 11 Downing Street from the Palace of Westminster after a meeting with the 
country‘s leading bankers; Sir George Paish accompanied him. As they passed Big Ben, the 
Chancellor asked the coachman‘s son to join him in the Treasury. The nation was facing a crisis 
with war imminent on the continent. Paish was reluctant to enter civil service, having preferred 
his unofficial position as advisor to one of the most influential men in the kingdom.
36
 But for an 
Englishman, duty could not be refused.  This son of a coachman found himself guiding national 
monetary policy at the outbreak of the Great War. How was such an unusual event possible?  
 
 Early Writing Career (1900-1909) 
 
 
 George Paish‘s relationship with the weekly newspaper The Statist: A Journal of 
Practical Finance and Trade began in late 1881, when he was fourteen. As secretary to the 
editor, he made daily price charts of principal securities to track the rates of investments, stocks, 
and bonds. After some time at the paper, his assignment changed to following the profits of 
American and British railways, which became the subject of his first book many years later. 
Perhaps seeing some promise in the young man, one of the paper‘s owners Sir Robert Giffen 
advised Paish to begin reading on economics, starting with Adam Smith. After educating himself 
in economics, Paish consequently became a lifelong advocate of the Free Trade position.
37
 
                                                   
36
 Sir George Paish, Memoir I, 61. 
 
37
 Ibid., 2. 
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According to his eldest son Frank, Paish ―continued his education by attending evening classes 
and wide reading‖ at this time.38  
Paish steadily rose through the paper‘s ranks ―through sheer ability and energy‖ during 
the 1880s and 1890s.
39
 After several years of work as secretary to the editor, he became the 
paper‘s sub-editor from 1888-1894.40 In this new position, Paish likely began writing for the 
paper on a regular basis, as a newspaper article in 1888 described him as a journalist.
41
  A few 
years later, the owners added Sir Edgar Vincent to their number in the 1890s. He ordered an 
internal investigation, and Paish received a promotion to Assistant Editor in 1894, a position he 
held for six years.  
In 1900, Paish became the third senior editor, joining Thomas Lloyd and Robert 
Mabson.
42
 Each had his own specialization. Lloyd, the senior of the three, had written on politics 
since 1880, while Mabson had focused on mining in South Africa since the same decade. Paish 
had worked with railway data before, but as editor, articles on British and American railways 
became his responsibility.
43
 He had literally worked his way to the top after almost twenty years, 
and he was only in his early thirties. 
                                                   
38
 Frank also remembered that his father ― not only spoke beautiful English but also wrote a beautiful 
hand.‖ Frank Paish, 7. 
 
39
 Middleton, ―Paish.‖ 
 
40
 ―Biographical History,‖ British Library of Political and Economic Science, London School of 
Economics, http://library-2.lse.ac.uk/archives/handlists/Paish/Paish.html (accessed February 21, 2011). 
 
41
 Paish had unsuccessfully attempted to save a drowning clergyman on August 1. He brought him in, but 
he had already died. The Royal Humane Society awarded Paish a medal for bravery for the attempt. The Times, 
Thursday, Aug 30, 1888; pg. 8; Issue 32478; col B. 
 
42
 Sir George Paish, Memoir I, 2. According to Paish, The Statist‘s finances also significantly improved 
under Sir Edgar‘s leadership. Promotion dates clarified by ―Biographical History,‖ British Library of Political and 
Economic Science, http://library-2.lse.ac.uk/archives/handlists/Paish/Paish.html (accessed February 21, 2011). 
 
43
 Sir George Paish, Memoir I, 5. Having proved himself as an economist by this time, he became a fellow 
of the Royal Statistical Society in December 1899. See: ―Report of the Council for the Financial Year Ended 31st 
December, 1899, and for the Sessional Year Ending 19th June, 1900, Presented at the Sixty-Sixth Annual General 
16 
 
The Statist sent Paish to America for the first time in 1899. The New York Times 
announced his arrival in New York in early March, hailing him as a well-known statistician from 
his work at The Statist. In an interview, he told the paper that he came to research and observe 
―‗mercantile, financial, commercial and economical conditions as I find them, and to collect data 
and statistics.‘‖44 American railroads were his primary concern, as The Statist‘s readership of 
English businessmen wanted to invest in that growing market. Paish planned on staying for about 
five weeks and visiting eight major cities. Protective tariffs that interfered with English trade, 
wages, and agricultural commodities were other objects of Paish‘s concern. 45   
British investors had concerns about the state of American currency, because William 
Jennings Bryan was advocating Free Silver and bimetallism to American voters. William 
McKinley had won the preceding 1896 presidential election on the platform of maintaining the 
gold standard. With another presidential election coming in 1900, Paish‘s purpose was to confer 
with Lyman Gage, McKinley‘s Secretary of the Treasury about the gold standard and to meet 
railway company presidents to analyze their progress. British investors bought gold bonds to 
help build the American rail system. The Free Silver movement threatened ―to make the coupons 
and the principle payable in silver dollars.‖46 Thus, future British investments were pending 
based on the outcome of the currency debate in America. Gage reassured Paish that America had 
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no ―intention whatsoever of leaving the gold standard.‖47 Presumably, Paish‘s position at The 
Statist had furnished him with the personal and political connections that arranged this meeting. 
Reassured that further British investments would proceed on the gold standard, Paish 
began meeting with American railway executives. Foremost among them was James J. Hill, 
President of the Great Northern Railroad, ―and the real author of the enormous expansion in 
railroad profits.‖48 Hill systematically increased the amount hauled on his railway by keeping 
ton-mile statistics and encouraging his branch managers to increase their hauls. The Northern 
Pacific Railway duplicated Hill‘s system and showed similar improvements.49 By hauling more 
weight, the railways saved on time and the number of trips, thereby cutting costs and increasing 
profits. Paish passed this advice on to investors, who then reaped the profits of this innovative 
business outlook. They could use better statistics and better records to direct their investments. 
Whenever he travelled abroad, Paish sent weekly updates to The Statist on the conditions 
in the country he was visiting. He analyzed the state of railway traffic for investors, mentioning 
that competition was motivating internal improvements to ship more goods faster. While 
shipping costs were dropping, profits remained steady because of the increased competition for 
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traffic. For this reason, investors could be confident to continue investing for the next several 
months.
50
  
At the end of his trip in May, the New York Times published Paish‘s last article from his 
trip to The Statist. He explained that the previous election of 1896 had recommitted the country 
to the gold standard, which restored confidence in banks and businesses. The gold standard was 
safe with the current Senate, and the coming election in 1900 could not alter that house‘s 
position. America‘s renewed economic confidence had led to increases in trade, wages, 
employment, investment, and spending. Paish summarized his positive report, saying, ―In brief, 
all the indications exist of the American Nation [sic] having entered upon a prolonged period of 
prosperity.‖51 
Upon his return to England, Paish decided to see how the British railways compared 
against the American ones. To his surprise, British reports had no record of ton-mileage. Instead, 
he had to process the figures for charges for freight and passengers and compare it to the number 
of miles traveled to get the data he needed for the London and North Western Railway. The 
average freight load was around forty-seven tons. The lowest figure on Hill‘s railway before the 
improvements was 150 tons.
52
 Sufficiently curious, Paish‘s research expanded to compare the 
London and North Western with the Pennsylvania Railroad from 1880 to 1900. The results 
confirmed that the British had failed to innovate while charging higher prices without expanding 
profits. Stockholders, owners, and other economists were soon looking into the issue.
53
Among 
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these was George Gibb, the manager of the North Eastern Railway, who gathered the necessary 
data for his railway and ―found that the average train load…was only 45 tons.‖54 This early 
collaboration with Gibb grew into a lasting friendship of more than forty years.  
In 1902 The Statist published Paish‘s first book, The British Railway Position, which 
consisted of revised articles that he had published over the preceding eighteen months. Paish was 
calling for railway managers to increase their efficiency for their own profit by keeping statistics, 
including the ton mile, which had been the focus of his study. His trip to America had convinced 
him that profit increases were a direct byproduct of making trains carry as much as current 
technology allowed. Heavier trains were more economical.
55
 
In the introduction, Gibb agreed that Paish‘s criticisms were valid and that better records 
and statistics could benefit the industry. Gibb pointed out that the train-mile only gives the 
distance, regardless of what the train was transporting, while ton-mileage gave knowledge of 
―the most vital elements in the cost of working freight traffic – namely, the train load and the 
length of haul. The train-mile unit conceals, the ton-mile reveals those all important facts. The 
revelation is worth paying for.‖56 The second argument in the book was to increase the ton-
mileage of English trains. Gibb and Paish both qualified this argument by saying statistics 
needed to come first before a new course of action could begin. Accounting for differences of 
geography and distance was not the focus of Paish‘s work, but American trans-continental 
freight was entirely different from the regional nature of British traffic.
57
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Reviewers‘ opinions of the book were generally positive. American reviewer Walter E. 
Weyl saw the primary merit of the book in ―the detailed study of the various British railroads,‖ 
but criticized the length, perceived tangents, and style.
58
 British response was more enthusiastic. 
William Mitchell Acworth was a British railway expert who praised Paish‘s book as ―a real and 
great service‖ which might mark the ―turning point in the movement for reform in English 
railway management.‖59 Acworth hoped the book would reach a wide audience to draw attention 
to the need for reform. Paish was calling for better records and statistics, knowing his personal 
estimates were imperfect. Acworth acknowledged that Paish had limited numbers to work from 
as ―actual figures do not exist.‖60Better statistics were the first step towards reform, and Acworth 
hoped for this sooner rather than later.  Middleton explained this new thrust in journalism, 
stating, ―The Statist . . . was at this time in the vanguard of the movement to formulate a more 
analytical approach to contemporary social and economic debates. Paish‘s special gifts for 
compiling and analysing quantitative information made him one of the foremost practitioners of 
the new statistical journalism.‖61  
In the autumn of 1904, Paish made another visit to America and Canada on behalf of The 
Statist. He had nothing but praise for the economic expansion that had followed in the wake of 
the Panics in 1893 and 1896, saying, ―the strength of to-day is in some measure the result of the 
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weakness that is passed.‖62 America could expect economic growth for many years. His reasons 
for this diagnosis were that capital was available; confidence was fostering trade, and agricultural 
products were profitable. Agriculture affected manufacturing and transportation, so ―the profits 
of all sections of the community are increased.‖63 While opposed to tariffs in general as a Free 
Trader, Paish observed that tariffs did not govern imports as much as the general condition of the 
economy. However, the difference in English and American trade was one of dependence. 
America was largely self-sufficient in resources, raw material, and manufacturing; meanwhile, 
England was dependent on imports because of her lack of natural resources. The stabilization of 
credit and the trade balance between imports and exports promised increased trade and economic 
growth for both countries.
64
 He wrote on international trade with some frequency for the rest of 
his life. 
Meanwhile, political changes were underway in Britain. Nineteenth century Liberalism 
advocated Free Trade and voting reform, but the party divided over the issue of Irish Home Rule. 
The Liberal Unionist party joined the Conservatives in opposition to this movement, establishing 
a decade long coalition government in 1895. They called themselves Unionists because 
maintaining Ireland meant the preservation of the Union.  Irish Home Rule continued to be an 
issue into the 1920s, when Ireland finally gained its independence.  
Joseph Chamberlain was a Liberal who opposed Home Rule, serving in the coalition 
government until 1903. After a trip to South Africa in 1903, he resigned his position in order to 
advocate tariff reform, specifically for Empire Preference. This program reflected his imperialist 
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and nationalist sentiments; however, it also split the coalition. Many politicians rightly thought 
that public opinion favored Free Trade. According to Paish, most Conservatives had not argued 
for protective tariffs for decades, but the idea of Fair Trade or protective tariffs began reemerging 
in the late nineteenth century.
65
 Chamberlain‘s advocacy misjudged the prevailing economic 
opinion, or he was simply a prophet of defeatism. As Dangerfield observed, Chamberlain‘s 
position implied ―that England was no longer commercial dictator of the world; that the Empire 
of Free Trade‖ would soon fall.66 
When the ruling government dissolved in 1905 following Prime Minister Arthur 
Balfour‘s resignation, the voters returned the Free Trade Liberals to power in 1906. Sir Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman became the Prime Minister, but resigned for health reasons in 1908. His 
departure led to Herbert Asquith‘s ascending from the Treasury to Prime Minister.  Lloyd 
George similarly moved up from the Board of Trade to the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
67
 
One result of Paish‘s earlier call for railway reform was that in 1906 he found himself on 
the Board of Trade‘s Commission on the British Railways, a ten-member committee with three 
representatives each from the railway stockholders, the government, and the railway managers, 
with Paish as the tenth member.
68
 Acworth was also on the committee and was probably one of 
the stockholders who sided with Paish, wanting statistics kept on ton and passenger miles. 
However, the politicians and railroad representatives outnumbered them, so after two years of 
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discussion, they narrowly averted the kind of progress that Paish advocated. This may have been 
a political dispute between Labour and Liberals, or it may simply have been the rejection of 
innovation.
69
 In 1925, Paish recalled the Committee‘s report ―led to the complete revision of the 
published accounts and statistics,‖ but this was only a partial victory, as the Committee did not 
vote to force ―the railways to publish or even to compile ton-and passenger-mile statistics‖ which 
would be the only way to judge their hauls and profitability.
70
  During World War I, the 
government took over the railroads, and the data existed, but was not included in reports. Writing 
in the early 1950s, Paish remarked that ―our railways [are] still awaiting the use of ton and 
passenger mile statistics.‖71 Such inefficiency and lack of progress frustrated him. 
Returning to questions of international finance, Paish wrote an article about New York as 
an international money market in late 1906, republished in America in January 1907. While 
American trade had expanded in the preceding decade, the country as a whole was not giving 
credit to other nations with the frequency the leading European countries did. American industry 
was still developing, so domestic investment took precedence over foreign investments. In fact, 
America was receiving more investments from foreigners than she was making. For the time 
being, America was not an international financial leader. However, New York was the center of 
domestic investments.
72
 After World War I, Paish was quick to observe how dramatically the 
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balance of credit had shifted, and New York took its place among the other world financial 
centers.  
Thus, newspapers and his peers recognized Paish as an economic expert by 1907. In 
1906, Sir Hugh Bell and George Gibb nominated him for membership at the Reform Club, a 
well-known Liberal establishment in London.
73
 The same year, the Royal Statistical Society 
elected him to its council.
74
 The weekly publication of The Statist still required most of his 
attention during the week, yet he found time to serve on the Board of Trade committee from 
1906-1908. Occasionally The New York Times consulted him on economic questions of trade and 
crisis. With so many commitments, Paish was probably something of a workaholic, constantly 
demonstrating that he had earned his position.  His son Frank simply remembered that when he 
was young, his father ―usually returned too late at night for me to see him.‖75  
Later in 1907, America was in the middle of another banking panic. In late October, in 
the midst of a recession, the Knickerbocker Trust Company, an important New York City firm, 
began running out of money. It closed its doors as a result of depositors seeking to withdraw 
their accounts. Panicked that they would lose their money, accountholders across the country ran 
on their banks as well. Banks limited the amounts they would pay out in order to prevent closing. 
According to Milton Friedman, ―restriction of payments cut short bank failures and ended the 
runs.‖ This contraction of economic activity caused by the lack of available cash prolonged the 
recession, but regular payments resumed within three months. Recovery commenced by the 
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summer of 1908.
76
 Friedman argued that restriction of payments was economically advisable, 
because under that system recessions last months instead of years.    
Within a week of the run on the Knickerbocker Trust Company, Paish and Francis Hirst, 
editor of the Economist, met with a correspondent from The New York Times in London and 
reassured the American public that the anxiety would be short-lived. Hirst suggested banking 
reforms, indicating that restored confidence would result in trade expansion after the uneasiness 
passed. He also regarded English banks as superior because their banking system was more 
secure, less prone to speculation, and were less likely to collapse from a run caused by ―lightly 
strung‖ nerves. Paish saw the origin of the crisis in progress that had ―been getting beyond the 
capital supply.‖ Such unsustainable activity ―reveals weak spots in the economic fabric of a 
nation,‖ which reform and regulation could then remedy. American assets precluded any serious 
fallout, and a restored balance between growth and expense would soon set things right. Other 
factors leading to renewed growth were increases in gold, which would secure the banks‘ 
reserves, and the continued prosperity of the railroads, which would continue to garner European 
investment to aid overall recovery.
77
 
In early 1909, The New York Times published Paish‘s trade outlook for international 
commerce for the coming year as part of their Annual Financial Review. Conditions following 
the Panic of 1907 were promising, as new supplies of gold were accumulating in the world‘s 
financial centers. A decrease in trade had resulted in a surplus of available capital. Large 
amounts of capital were guaranteed to stimulate trade because of low interest rates available for 
investors. However, Paish warned that political tensions in Europe created a climate of 
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uncertainty. The trade outlook depended on the outcome of that perilous situation. Although 
prolonged uncertainty would delay hopes for recovery, Paish indicated that America would 
likely recover quickest, as European political concerns were less likely to affect their domestic 
markets.
78
  
In the summer of 1909, Paish also began submitting papers to the Royal Statistical 
Society. Taking a great step from his analysis of railroads, he presented ―Great Britain‘s Capital 
Investments in Other Lands‖ to an audience of fellow statisticians. Similar to his railway 
analysis, Paish sought to provide an estimate where none existed before - taking conflicting 
information, processing the figures, and presenting a unified whole. By utilizing tax reports from 
the Commissioners of Inland Revenue alongside thousands of public company profit statements, 
Paish hoped to provide an accurate estimate of British capital invested in other countries as well 
as the amount of capital those investments were generating for the British.
79
 
Paish began by noting that investments did not yield immediate returns, sometimes 
needing ten or twenty years to ―[become] fully productive.‖ Paish found that the rate of foreign 
investments had contracted from 1898 to 1904 because of the Boer War, but the average was 
returning to its prewar level.
80
 Because the British were prosperous, they had money to invest. 
Good investments yielded a high return, resulting in prosperity. According to Paish, ―this growth 
of our trade and prosperity is largely the result of our investment of capital in other countries. By 
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building railways [in foreign countries], we have enabled the world to increase its production of 
wealth at a rate never previously witnessed.‖81 The British brought the Industrial Revolution and 
modern transportation to other countries and, consequently, bought their ―foodstuffs and raw 
materials‖ while exporting manufactured goods.82 Thus, Paish indirectly argued the position of 
Free Trade economics – everyone profits by seeking mutually beneficial terms of exchange.83  
Discussion followed the paper‘s presentation, with a variety of commendations and 
questions as to his method and estimates acting as an immediate peer review. The nature of 
unofficial statistics was that everyone could find fault with them in some way. Some thought his 
figures too conservative, others too high. Everyone agreed that the issue was important and that 
Paish‘s paper was an admirable effort to bring attention to it. The President of the Royal 
Statistical Society, Sir Charles Dilke, moderated the discussion and pointed out that while many 
estimates on the subject might disagree in particulars, they agreed as to the total amount. He also 
noted that foreign investment was not detracting from domestic concerns, and that large amounts 
of foreign investment were indicative of the country‘s well-being.84 In reply to questions on his 
figures, Paish defended his estimates. He had not conjectured them at random, but he ―thought 
that every figure in the paper was based on documentary evidence.‖85  
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Advising David Lloyd George and Hopes for Peace (1909-1914) 
 
With the help of Sir Edgar Speyer, an investment banker, Paish was moving into a 
politically influential position. Apparently satisfied with Paish‘s earlier advice on investment 
prospects, Speyer wrote to Lloyd George in 1909 suggesting that Paish‘s economic analyses 
might be useful to him.
86
 Lloyd George took this advice, and in the middle of 1909, Paish began 
advising him on economic subjects, a service he rendered to him for the following six years, 
which he called his ―happy association with that great statesman.‖87  
When Lloyd George was preparing his budget in 1909, he asked Paish‘s ―opinion of the 
trade outlook for 1910 and 1911.‖ Paish predicted continued expansion in trade based on 
investment trends. Indeed, he thought the economic growth would continue in the years to come. 
Meanwhile, the Chancellor‘s official advisors disagreed, predicting a decline in trade. Expanded 
trade vindicated Paish‘s predictions, and in 1911, ―Lloyd George was gratified to find that the 
revenue results were…better than he had hoped.‖88 Shortly thereafter, Lloyd George ―suggested 
that I should be honoured with a knighthood,‖ and George V knighted him in 1912 as part of the 
King‘s birthday honors.89 
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However, the 1909 Budget was not an ordinary piece of government legislation. Since 
the nineteenth century, the Liberals had been the party of reform, and Lloyd George was willing 
to take risks to gain unprecedented reforms. The Liberals had been the ruling government since 
1906, yet a climate of political agitation festered. The Conservatives and the House of Lords had 
been blocking the Liberals at every turn whenever they came to power.
90
 In response, the 
Liberals, Labour, and the Irish formed a rather complicated alliance.  
Lloyd George‘s 1909 Budget needed extra funds, which he sought to get from the rich 
landed families. Such taxation against hereditary privilege appalled the House of Lords, who 
vetoed the bill in defiance of constitutional precedent. Prime Minister Asquith dissolved 
Parliament, and in the following year‘s election, the Liberals won a narrow majority with the 
Conservatives close behind. The Labour and Irish parties then sided with the Liberals, but the 
Irish had one condition. The Irish ―as good as held Mr. Asquith‘s IOU – Home Rule was to be 
paid them in return for those eight score votes of theirs which had put the Budget through.‖91 In 
1911, with the possibility of King George V (his father Edward VII had died in May 1910) 
intervening to create new peers who would vote properly, the House of Lords passed Asquith‘s 
Parliament Act, surrendering their veto power.
92
 
The drama in Parliament took two years to play out. After giving Lloyd George the trade 
outlook for the Budget, Paish returned to America for another survey trip for The Statist in the 
autumn of 1909. Shortly after his arrival, the Bank of England increased interest on new 
American loans to five percent. Rather than attributing the price increase to distrust or inflation, 
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more level headed authorities thought the cause was more likely the increased demand for loans 
from other countries. With a high demand for gold and a limited supply, the higher interest rate 
narrowed the competition for loans to those who were most likely to pay it back quickly.
93
 
American investments were stable, as Paish attested to in the article he sent back to London. 
European fears of American speculation were without foundation. He reminded the English that 
Americans had money at their disposal for investment, so prices had gone up despite speculators‘ 
efforts ―to keep prices down by ‗selling short.‘‖ The article‘s author concluded that Paish‘s 
assessment differed markedly from other British financial journalists, ―who almost without 
exception take every opportunity to urge the British public to be cautious‖ about investing in 
America.
94
 Paish had the benefit of many years‘ knowledge, and had recommended British 
investment in American railways as a profitable, though expensive undertaking. In his opinion, 
Anglo-American economic relations were generally profitable, and he encouraged its expansion 
when possible. 
 For example, in one of Paish‘s articles to The Statist during his trip, he observed that 
most Europeans had no appreciation for the reality of the American economy. It was not a short-
term ―bubble,‖ but a strong and growing force. Such continuous progress resulted from several 
factors: natural resources, an efficient work force, reward for good work, and distribution of 
prosperity in the form of good wages above subsistence level. The average American employee 
had enough money to live, spend some on luxuries, and save some of it as well. Paish compared 
the average wages of British and American workers and concluded that Americans had 
proportionately higher wages, purchasing power, and savings. The ability of all classes to invest 
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was aiding the growth of the American economy. Additionally, the growing American 
population was fueling the construction industry around the country, and homeownership was a 
common investment for average workers. While some investments were prone to speculation, 
many American businesses promised a good return on investment.
95
 
A week later, on October 31, Paish gave a lecture on ―The British Budget and Social 
Reform‖ at Columbia University, which the Academy of Political Science published the 
following spring in the Political Science Quarterly. At this point, the House of Lords had not yet 
vetoed the Budget, which occurred a month later on November 30. Paish began by outlining the 
government‘s current revenues by source. Everyone paid indirect taxes on luxuries: alcohol and 
tobacco, income, inheritance, stamps, property, and certain ―semi-necessaries, viz., tea, sugar, 
coffee, cocoa,‖ etc., and the government did not tax necessaries like food or raw materials for 
manufacturing.
96
 Paish then explained that less than fourteen percent of the population paid 
direct taxes such as income and estate taxes. This fourteen percent owned a disproportionate 
amount of the nation‘s wealth. Between maintaining the naval buildup for security and 
expanding social reforms, the government needed more revenue.
97
  
Against this context, Paish enumerated the 1909 Budget‘s proposals for government 
assistance, in the hopes that increased spending in that area would be balanced by profitable 
results – such as in the elderly‘s ability to work from home or for the unemployed to find work 
through labor exchanges. These economic concerns were directly related to education reform as 
well. From experience, Paish knew that the added income of teenage children was essential to 
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working class families, so raising the minimum leaving age for schooling to fifteen was a 
sacrifice these families could not afford to pay. Providing unemployment assistance and other 
reforms would allow the children to stay in school.
98
 After explaining the lofty goals of social 
reform, Paish explained how Lloyd George‘s Budget accounted for the additional needed 
revenues: higher taxes on alcohol, income, and land taxes, although the increases in the two areas 
of direct taxation were relatively small – less than one percent.99 Since Paish had worked with 
Lloyd George on the economic circumstances that would support this Budget, naturally he 
favored these proposals and worked to present them in a positive and logical way. 
Paish‘s primary recollection of this trip was his visit to Washington ―to suggest to 
President Taft that he should form a World Police Force so strong that no one would dare attack 
it.‖100 Paish‘s, and indeed Taft‘s, later enthusiasm for the League of Nations complemented this 
incipient idea of an international association created to deter war, an idea both of them were 
committed to for the rest of their lives. Paish ―arrived in Washington early in December 1909, 
with this purpose in view and was taken to the President by my friend, Mr. George E. Roberts, 
Director of the Mint. Mr. Taft was receptive, and after our talk asked me to see the Assistant 
Secretary of State,‖ who then asked Paish to write out this proposal.101 His ideas were 
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acknowledged by the Secretary of State Huntington Wilson, and former President Theodore 
Roosevelt mentioned similar ideas the following year upon receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. 
Many leading men of the time seemed to think that preventing war through discussion was a 
promising idea for modern nations, although each nation needed to retain its defenses as an 
international police force to prevent war did not exist yet.
102
  
In 1910, alongside The Economist‘s Hirst, Paish contributed to a National Monetary 
Commission report on the subject of ―The Trade Balance of the United States.‖ The reports of 
this Commission became the foundation of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913.
103
 After a detailed 
treatment on trade balances and gold reserves, Paish‘s conclusion was that the United States 
would benefit from a centralized bank like the Bank of England. ―A central institution of the 
nature of the Bank of England charged with the special duty of assisting the country to obtain the 
currency it needs . . . would take measures to prevent the export of gold and to secure additional 
supplies‖ as needed ―would thus prevent or diminish the monetary stringency that would 
otherwise occur.‖104  
In England, Paish‘s relationship with Lloyd George continued. After his previous 
estimates were justified by high revenues for the 1911 budget, his position with Lloyd George 
was secure. According to Paish, ―From that time onward, whenever Lloyd George had to make a 
speech to the Bankers, his secretary applied to me for ‗notes‘.‖105  In July 1911, he made 
suggestions for Lloyd George‘s Mansion House Speech. The Second Moroccan Crisis had 
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brought investments to a standstill. His overall trade predictions were positive, but he suggested 
that Lloyd George ―say something reassuring about the Moroccan situation in order to build up 
confidence,‖ so that new investments would resume.106 To his surprise, Lloyd George gave a 
very patriotic speech in which he declared that certain sacrifices were acceptable to preserve 
peace, but if the sacrifice were ―the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has 
won by centuries of heroism and achievement . . . then . . . peace at that price would be a 
humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure.‖107 The speech was popular in 
London, but sent a clear message to France and Germany that Britain would not be sidelined 
from continental affairs.
108
 
In his memoir, Paish recounted an incident between General Sir John French, Inspector-
General of the British Army, and the Kaiser shortly after Lloyd George‘s speech.109 The Kaiser‘s 
remarks amounted to a threat that he could conquer France in six weeks before turning his 
attentions to England. The ―British Fleet prepared for war. . . [and] shadowed the German 
Fleet.‖110 Then, quite unexpectedly, about two hundred German businessmen asked the Kaiser to 
postpone the war for two years in order for them to free themselves of international investments. 
Thus, the war did not come in 1911. ―Beneath this surface, however, war was brewing: a war 
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that, given the excuse, Germany was quite prepared to fight some years before 1914.‖ Further 
German naval expansion showed that the Kaiser‘s ―lust for power transcended all other 
considerations. Peace was impossible with such a man.‖111 
 In the years leading up to the war, Paish continued his travels. His reputation and 
introductions from friends allowed him to meet officials in Germany and America, where he 
made visits in 1912 and 1913, respectively. His assessment of Germany‘s frustrations was that 
the country ―wanted colonies. In particular she wanted to take over Brazil, but could not do so 
because of [British] support of the Monroe Doctrine‖ which ―guaranteed all the South American 
countries from aggression by a European nation.‖112 In America, he met with President Wilson, 
who had questions on British policy toward Mexico. Secretary of the Treasury William McAdoo 
then asked him for advice on the Federal Reserve Act, which he was happy to give. As his paper 
for the National Monetary Commission affirmed, Paish favored the creation of the Federal 
Reserve System, which occurred in 1913.
113
 
 
Wartime Work in the Treasury (1914-1915) 
 
 
 After years of uneasy peace, on 28 June 1914, Gavrilo Princip killed the Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand and his wife Sophie in Sarajevo. As heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, his tragic 
death provided premise for his nation and her allies to go to war. Germany showed great interest 
in the subsequent course of events. The July Crisis of 1914 bridged the assassination and the 
declaration of war on Serbia by Austria-Hungary. At that time, the alliances of the Great Powers 
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made a general war possible. The balance of power that had prevented war for decades crumbled 
in a matter of weeks.
114
 
 Before the formal declarations of war, Paish was still working at The Statist, and every 
week he wrote an article on the London Money Market. Austria-Hungary‘s declaration of war on 
July 28 had created a crisis. When Paish went round to the banks on July 29, his first stop was 
with ―Mr. Ruff, manager of the Swiss Bankverein.‖ The normally friendly man ―was desperately 
worried. He told me that the money market had broken down.‖ Since his bank was foreign, the 
Bank of England was not obligated to help him. Any large withdrawal would force him to close. 
Paish‘s next statement revealed his general and personal sympathy: ―It was grim news indeed, 
but what distressed me more than anything else was the dire plight of this charming man, and the 
fact that, on giving me this news, he broke down and cried.‖115 In the midst of a looming 
international crisis, Paish‘s primary recollection was its effects on individuals.  
 News from the Bank of England was not any better. As Paish‘s conversation with 
Director Frederick Jackson indicated:  
Paish: ―What has happened to the Money market? They tell me that it has broken down.‖  
Jackson: ―It has. We the Accepting Houses, in contact with the continent, cannot get our 
remittances and eight of us are going to declare ourselves insolvent next week.‖ 
Paish: ―You can't do that.‖ 
Jackson: ―We have no option. My own firm has £5,000,000 of bills to meet next week 
and no money to meet them with. The total deficiency is £50,000,000.‖ 
Paish: ―You must not fail‖ 
Jackson: ―We can‘t help it.‖116 
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He went to speak with Lloyd George at 11 Downing Street, who asked for updates as they 
became available. The story was the same at Lloyds Bank the next day, which was Thursday, 
July 30. Depositors were asking for gold, but were getting notes redeemable at the Bank of 
England. A quick visit to that Bank showed him that a run was in progress.
117
  
Another meeting with Lloyd George resulted in an invitation to join a meeting on the 
subject the next day. He arrived early on Friday, July 31, and the Chancellor asked him to write a 
note giving reasons not to suspend specie payments.  Paish‘s only recollection of his reason was 
―It is unnecessary to suspend specie payments, for every Britisher is a loyal subject and will 
respond to a public appeal to stop drawing his account from the banks, if asked to do so by the 
Government.‖ That evening‘s ―meeting decided not to suspend payments,‖ with assurances from 
the Bank of England that they had enough gold to cover their notes.
118
 
Afterwards, Paish accompanied Lloyd George back to Downing Street. The conversation 
was a turning point for Paish. 
On the way he asked me to come into the Treasury as his assistant. This was not very 
much to my liking and I told him that I had no wish to become a civil servant. He replied 
that that would mean that I could never, in future, attend any of the committee meetings 
called to discuss help to the bankers. As I wanted to make sure that this help would not 
fail to be given, I agreed to his suggestions and was asked to report for duty on Monday 
morning.
119
 
 
Thus, Sir George began his work with the Treasury on Monday, August 3, traditionally a 
banking holiday. Over breakfast, the group of eight advisors agreed that peace was the most 
desirable course of action. Lloyd George left them for a Cabinet meeting, returning two hours 
later. ―With one voice we asked: ‗What is it?‘ He answered in one word: ‗War.‘ There was a 
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moment of stunned silence, and then one of us – I don‘t know who – asked: ‗On what grounds?‘ 
‗The Germans,‘ said Mr. Lloyd George, ‗have invaded Belgium . . . and Belgium is under our 
guarantee.‘‖120 
Paish was one of many who worked the ―long weekend‖ of August 4-6 trying to avert a 
banking crisis following Britain‘s declaration of war.121 The same day he set to work on ―a plan 
to preserve the eight Accepting Houses from bankruptcy.‖122 The British government guaranteed 
the Bank of England and printed more money to alleviate any potential panic. The Treasury gave 
trading institutions and banks a moratorium – more time to collect and thus avoid bankruptcy, as 
the declaration of war had already disrupted the flow of international trade.
123
 The plan saved the 
banks – ―not one House failed.‖ Now that Britain had declared war, specie payments had to be 
suspended. The traditional Bank Holiday for Monday was extended for the entire week.
124
   
Two months later, Paish summarized the issues the Government faced with the banks, 
saying, ―there were…large sums owing to banks which had accepted bills of German and 
Austrian houses, and these were at once rendered uncollectible for the time being. The guarantee 
by the Government, through the Bank of England, will protect those people who would have 
been unable to pay their bills.‖125 The Government further guaranteed these international banks 
by advancing funds and ―to postpone until a year after the end of the War any claim against them 
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for repayment.‖ This measure provided a lengthy extension of time for the banks to recover 
naturally and continue their business as usual.
126
 In September, Paish advised Lloyd George to 
lift the banking moratorium by early November, 1914, which he did.
127
 
Part of Paish‘s responsibility at the Treasury was to let Lloyd George know what he as 
Chancellor was to do the next day. Lloyd George then required a memo on those activities by 
early the next morning. For Paish, this meant ―a hasty dinner followed by a long period of work. 
I usually went to bed rather late, and had to be up again at about 4.30 to write again until 6.0. It 
was hard work, but I enjoyed it and felt that I was doing something really worthwhile for my 
country.‖128 The stress and demands exhausted Paish physically and mentally.  
 At the invitation of Secretary McAdoo, Sir George went to America to assure them of the 
continued need and desire for the free exchange of cotton. Lloyd George asked Paish to write 
one more memo on the American position shortly before he left - a stiff undertaking to finish in 
only one day.  At the time, America owed Britain a large amount of money, but Paish pointed 
out that if the war continued, Britain would end up borrowing from America.
129
 He was soon 
proved right, as his writings throughout the 1920s dealt extensively with the issue of war debts to 
America. 
The outbreak of war increased the British demand for cotton, but the war had upset 
international trade, impeding the transport of raw materials from America. Initially, cotton was 
not on the embargo list to the belligerent powers. Large amounts of cotton went to European 
countries without incident for a few months. As the war continued, however, the British 
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blockade of Germany prevented the cotton trade, in violation of the initial agreement with the 
Americans.  
 Thus, shortly after the resolution of the banking issues, Paish and Basil Blackett, another 
Treasury official, were on their way to America to discuss the cotton trade and international 
trade.
130
 The New York Times sub-headline read ―Cotton and Its By-Products Declared Non-
Contraband.‖ McAdoo said:  
 Their visit is the result of informal suggestions made by me through diplomatic 
 channels to the Chancellor of the Exchequer in London. It is believed that a discussion 
 of certain phases of these problems on the ground here may be productive of 
 beneficial results. This is simply another of those instances where the Government is 
 using its good offices to help the business situation.
131
  
They arrived in New York on October 16, 1914. Paish summarized the financial health of Britain 
as ―conditions are practically normal in London. . . . We do not look for any trouble when the 
moratorium expires, on Nov. 4.‖132    
From New York, they went to Washington. His purpose in meeting with McAdoo was 
―to receive information, not to make suggestions.‖133 However, he made suggestions anyway 
when asked for his opinion. He said that the Stock Exchanges should reopen soon, since the 
initial panic that accompanied the outbreak of war had passed.
134
 The New York Times got the 
idea that Paish‘s meetings with the Treasury might result in ―the synchronous opening of the 
London and New York Stock Exchanges and the opening of the British and American Cotton 
                                                   
 
130
 The Times, Monday, Oct 12, 1914; pg. 14; Issue 40663; col B;  ―Britain Sending Trade Conferees,‖ 
Special to The New York Times. New York Times (1857-1922); Oct 11, 1914; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The 
New York Times (1851 - 2006), 12. 
 
 
131
 New York Times, Oct. 11, 1914. 
 
 132New York Times (1857-1922); Oct 17, 1914. 
 
 
133
 Ibid. 
 
 134 ―The Financial Situation in America and Europe,‖ New York Times (1857-1922); Oct 19, 1914; 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2006), 10. 
41 
 
Exchanges.‖ By opening both simultaneously, financiers hoped that the trade balance might be 
restored.
135
 The New York Stock Exchange reopened for limited exchanges first, on November 
28, 1914. The London Exchange reopened on January 4, 1915.
136
 
 On October 19, Paish and Blackett met President Wilson. They informed him that the 
financial situation of Europe was dependent on support from the United States. Wilson agreed to 
help in any way he could.
137
 In a press conference on October 22, Wilson said that Paish told him 
that England was willing to accept American cotton because ―their factories presently will be 
standing still unless the cotton begins to be shipped…they would naturally buy as much as 
possible at a low price and store it against‖ future needs.138 At the beginning of the war, America 
owed money to Britain, and Paish suggested that cotton exports would help to pay that debt 
instead of only using gold that was backing American currency and business.
139
  
In addition to meeting with Treasury officials, Paish conferred with the leading bankers 
of New York to discuss debts, exchange, and the cotton question.
140
 In a letter to Wilson dated 
October 24, British Ambassador Cecil Spring Rice gave Sir George‘s opinion on the cotton 
question: ―Paish tells me that the negotiations . . . are going on well . . . .He thinks the question 
of the purchase of cotton depends on whether or no there is reason to believe that bottom prices 
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have been reached.‖141 Paish pointed out that as the war continued, Britain would buy significant 
amounts of American raw materials and food. The balance of trade would then be in America‘s 
favor. He did not see the need for loans at this point, as everyone expected the war to be short.
142
 
Yet he did suggest the directors of the Federal Reserve Banks ―to open their banks as quickly as 
possible,‖ which they did. The schedule was for the banks to open in January of 1915, but they 
opened in November, which Paish described as ―a piece of American ‗hustle‘ that was of 
immense value to the war effort.‖143 
 In late October, an official announcement came to America that guaranteed overseas 
trade of cotton. On the 29
th
, McAdoo wrote to Wilson to inform him of the progress on the 
matter. He informed Wilson of Paish and Blackett‘s visit:  
 …to confer with me and American bankers, with a view to still further improving the 
 conditions of foreign exchange and of helping the cotton situation. Their visit has been 
 fruitful of good results already. Growing out of these discussions and as a result of the 
 negotiations of the State Department and the British government, assurances have been  
received from that Government that cotton is on the free list and will remain so, and that 
shipments of cotton, even to the ports of belligerent powers, under neutral  flags will be 
respected.
144
 
 
This measure proved to be short-lived. By late November, the problem was beginning to right 
itself, making further discussion unnecessary.
145
 In 1915, the British declared ―cotton as 
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contraband of war,‖ limiting the trade at the moment that it was just starting to recover. Exports 
diminished not long thereafter.
146
  
 By November, the official business with the Treasury was complete, and Sir George met 
with other leading financial authorities. He spoke to the Bankers‘ Convention in Philadelphia, 
saying ―that the financial obstacles in England had been satisfactorily adjusted, and that the way 
was now clear for the resumption of business on a normal basis.‖147 One American journalist 
dubbed him the ―British ambassador of prosperity,‖ lauding him for his work on the war thus far 
because of the complicated economics of empire, loans, exchange, and trade. ―The views of a 
man dealing with these problems…are inferior to those of no other man of finance.‖148 The 
journalist recognized that America was in a unique position as a prosperous and neutral power; 
with a resumption of normal banking, Sir George said that the United States would need ―to 
enlarge its operations as an international money lender.‖149 The potential of American exports 
and finance soon came to fruition, with America financing the Entente in loans and goods. 
 Upon his departure from America, The Times correspondent said that even though the 
results of Paish‘s mission were uncertain, pending further discussion in London, his visit was 
productive, nevertheless. He ―has brought Washington, New York, and London into closer touch 
than any amount of official correspondence could have done.‖150 Although business prospects 
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had improved, Paish was not sure the time had come to reopen the Stock Exchange, which had 
closed with the outbreak of the war.
151
  
 Bankers in New York gave Paish assurances of their desire to help.  ―J.P. Morgan, who 
was at the pier to see his partner away, said to Sir George Paish that if there was anything the 
New York banking house could do to improve the situation action would not be denied.‖152 This 
must have been J.P. Morgan, Jr. His partner, Henry P. Davison, joined Paish and Blackett to 
work out a contract for supplies, with the Morgans as ―buying  Agents in America during the 
war.‖153 John Hays Hammond, a former special ambassador and mining magnate, hosted a lunch 
for Sir George in New York before his departure. ―As I was leaving, he shook me by the hand 
and said: ‗Goodbye, Sir George, and remember this. When you want us, we will come.‘ I 
returned home feeling that a good job had been done and that the future was safe.‖154 
 Later, correspondents indicated that the British delegation to America had been 
unnecessary. While Paish was still in America, many hoped that the natural course of trade 
would restore itself soon.
155
  Indeed, McAdoo and the Federal Reserve Board realized that 
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―improving conditions‖ had satisfied the issues that the British visit came to rectify.156 New York 
bankers sent their own representatives to accompany Paish and Blackett in order to keep 
communications open.
157
 By December, the governments of both countries realized the 
economic crisis had passed; time had restored the economic status quo, and no special 
arrangements for trade were needed.
158
 An overview of war finance with America appeared in 
The Times in July 1919. ―The rapid extension of the British Navy‘s control of the Atlantic 
shipping lanes‖ restored the normal flow of international trade, making Paish and Blackett‘s visit 
to Washington superfluous.
159
 Paish had hoped in October 1914 that ―increasing exports‖ would 
preclude any need for ―special measures,‖ which apparently happened.160 Special measures 
became necessary only later, as the war lasted much longer than anyone originally anticipated.   
 Immediately prior to departing from America, Paish conducted a final interview with the 
New York Times. He thought the New York Stock Exchange opening would go well, and he 
advised trading with English cities in spite of the London Exchange being closed. When asked 
about the war‘s benefit to America, Paish uttered an almost prophetic reply: ―No misfortune that 
falls upon a great number of people can benefit any other for any length of time. During the war 
the United States will have great prosperity. Your misfortunes will come later.‖161 The Great 
Depression came a little less than fifteen years later and proved him painfully correct. In his 
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estimation, the war would end only when they were sure ―militarism is crushed forever.‖162  
Paish then predicted that ―commerce will go on in spite of the war, but after hostilities close the 
nations, to use an electrical phrase, will short-circuit Germany.‖163 This prediction proved true, 
as Germany faced economic ruin because of reparations, inflation, a worthless currency, and 
high unemployment that resulted from the peace.
164
   
 On his arrival in Britain, he refused to comment on his official business, but he did say 
that America was neutral only in its governmental position. The people ―do not disguise their 
feelings. Any success of the Allies is openly hailed with joy. Americans have no doubt whatever 
about the result of the conflict.‖165 On the economic side, business had resumed and things 
―could scarcely be better.‖166 America sold war goods on credit and eventually took over the role 
from Britain as main creditor nation, which Paish predicted in December, 1914.
167
 
 He resumed his responsibilities at the Treasury in December, and in January 1915, John 
Maynard Keynes joined the Treasury as his assistant. ―This was in preparation for my own 
resignation, which because of certain developments, was rapidly becoming necessary. . . . [Lloyd 
George] told me that he wanted to appoint me to a new post, and I realised immediately that, if I 
accepted, I would become a permanent civil servant.‖ As Paish wished to avoid this course, he 
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resigned from the Treasury to return to The Statist, while still working with the Treasury 
informally as he had done before.
168
  
 Dated January 19, 1915 from his home in Limpsfield, his resignation letter read,  
To the Right Hon.ble. The Chancellor of the Exchequer,  
Sir,  
For sometime past I have found my duties at the Treasury so full of anxiety that I 
have suffered from insomnia and am apprehensive of a total breakdown.  
In these circumstances I feel compelled to relinquish the post at the Treasury to 
which you so kindly appointed me last autumn and to tender you my resignation.  
I need scarcely say that if at any time I can be of service to my country and to you 
I shall be entirely at your disposal  
Your obedient servant,  
George Paish.
169
 
 
 Paish‘s resignation received a reply in late March from Lloyd George, who accepted it 
―with the greatest reluctance.‖ His knowledge, experience, and ―resourcefulness which you 
displayed on every occasion, contributed in no small degree to the success with which we were 
able to meet and overcome one set of difficulties after another.‖ He thanked him for his efforts, 
and hoped he would soon recover from the strain of his position. ―I trust that we may still have 
the benefit of your assistance when occasion requires.‖170  
However, his relationship with Lloyd George would have altered anyway, as Lloyd 
George left the Treasury for the Ministry of Munitions in May 1915. By the following summer, 
he was Secretary of State for War, and in December 1916, he replaced Asquith as Prime 
Minister. While Lloyd George advanced politically during the war, Paish decided to leave civil 
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service, though he still desired to do his part for the war effort in his own way – through writing 
and lecturing to the civilian and military populations.  
 
Post-Treasury Activities (1915-1916) 
 
Paish had first applied statistical analysis to Britain‘s railways to determine cost 
efficiency; during the war, statistical analysis of economic strength became a significant factor 
for planning victory by attrition. According to Broadberry and Harrison, at the outbreak of war, 
both sides intended to win ―by military, not economic means, and [the war] was to be finished 
off long before economic factors could be brought into play. It was only after this plan had 
failed, as the leaders on each side contemplated the ensuing stalemate, that belts began to be 
tightened and sleeves rolled up for the mobilisation of entire economies.‖171 
 Paish wrote several articles throughout the war, and he lectured with frequency after 
leaving the Treasury.
172
 Paish recognized that the Allies were more economically prepared to 
deal with a long war than was Germany. The longer Germany fought, the worse the peace 
conditions would be.
173
 By the end of 1915, German submarines were destroying large amounts 
of shipping, so prices for all materials increased because transportation and its insurance 
involved higher risk and cost.
174
 With the war continuing so much longer than anticipated, loans 
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from America became necessary to finance the Entente. Initially Paish thought the amounts were 
manageable, but with inflation, the debts were mounting rapidly, and he knew that Britain would 
have to work very hard to pay it back after the war.
175
 For this reason, many of Paish‘s lectures 
encouraged economy on the home front, encouraging citizens to cut back on luxuries in order to 
buy war bonds.
176
 The war was costing more than anyone had fathomed, and all the European 
nations were steadily falling into debt with each other and America. Paish hoped that the 
economic expansion that the war had occasioned would continue after the war, notwithstanding 
Britain‘s debts to America.177  
In March 1916, Paish presented a paper on ―War Finance‖ to the Royal Statistical 
Society, which appeared in the society‘s journal that May. He said that the war ―now seems to be 
approaching its final stages,‖ and that Britain‘s war economy was stronger than anticipated.178 In 
Paish‘s view, the mobilization of existing industry and the return on overseas investments had 
partially offset the war‘s vast expenditures until that point.179 Income, prices, and wages had 
increased, but this did not necessarily mean a proportionate increase in production. Higher prices 
were largely responsible for the fifty-seven percent increase in income, and the number of people 
employed in production industries was down from pre-war times because so many men were at 
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the front.
180
 However, Paish noted that the production capacity of women had increased 
substantially as they took the men‘s places in the factories.181 He emphasized that people did not 
generally produce at their full capacity in peace time, and untapped labor resources still existed 
to supplement more men leaving industry for the war. At that point, ―it will be imperative for 
everyone to work more efficiently and harder than ever before in order to maintain the 
production and income of the nation and to meet the expenses of the war.‖182  
After examining the effects of labor and production, Paish explored the total amounts 
―raised and spent for war purposes.‖183 Parliament had passed new taxes to help finance the war 
effort, but the amounts raised did not compare to the amounts spent. He estimated nearly two 
billion pounds would be needed for another year of fighting.  His advice was for the British 
people to continue working hard, keeping production up, and being cost-effective with the goals 
of maintaining the Navy, supporting its allies financially, and fielding an army of four million 
men. Civilians fought this economic battle, which was ―a task worthy of [Britain‘s] great 
traditions.‖184 
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Mental Collapse and Recovery - Looking Towards the Post-War World (1916-1918) 
 
 Paish remained active after leaving the Treasury, writing, lecturing, and traveling within 
Great Britain until the middle of 1916. While his memoir simply stated that the traveling 
schedule ―was beyond my strength, and I found it necessary to go to Exeter for a long rest. My 
health, in fact, kept me in Devonshire, away from London, from July nearly to Christmas.‖185 His 
friend Sir George Gibb supplied the full details of Paish‘s illness in a private letter to Lloyd 
George. He revealed that Paish‘s illness was mental, ―brought on mainly by the work and worry 
which he has had since the outbreak of War. He is suffering from delusions.‖ He showed signs of 
paranoia and was afraid that Treasury officials were trying to kill him. Paish entered an asylum, 
feeling protected from the outside world. Gibb continued, ―Apart from his delusions his mind is 
entirely clear and unaffected and you might talk to him for a whole day without ever detecting a 
trace of delusion; then one would suddenly break out.‖ Paish requested a letter from Lloyd 
George as evidence of his good will. He was worried that some articles in The Statist had 
offended him, and he wanted Lloyd George to know ―he had nothing to do‖ with the articles in 
question. Gibb concluded that ―a nice letter from you would be a great comfort and help to him,‖ 
and that the doctors had hope that his illness was not permanent.
186
 
Lloyd George wrote to Paish the same day,  
My dear Paish,  
I was so sorry to hear the other day that you had had a break-down in health. The 
overwork and anxiety of the War is telling on us all, and I feel myself sometimes as if I 
should like to take a voyage to the South Sea Islands and squat on the most inaccessible 
of them, where no papers could reach me, and remain there until this terrible War is over.  
You must take a thorough rest. You thoroughly deserve it. No man gave me 
greater help during the severe financial crisis which followed the outbreak of war, and 
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your sagacious and well-informed counsel contributed materially to saving this country 
from disaster. I shall always feel grateful to you for the help you gave me then. You 
always took a brave, courageous and hopeful view of the situation. Throughout the whole 
of the tenure of my Office at the Treasury I relied more upon your advice than upon that 
of any of my other advisors, and in every instance your judgment of the outlook was 
justified by the event. 
I am anxious that you should take a thorough rest, free from all care, for public as 
well as for personal reasons, because I feel certain that next year we shall need your 
counsel more than ever. But meanwhile take the advice of a friend: dismiss all care from 
your mind; do not bother about anything, and whatever you do, dismiss worry. You have 
honestly deserved a rest and you can feel that you at any rate have contributed more than 
most people to help your country in its greatest trouble. 
Ever your sincere and grateful friend, 
    D.L.G.
187
 
 
By the end of 1916, Paish was again beginning to write. Memos in the Lloyd George 
papers and the National Archives showed that he was attempting to demonstrate the severity of 
the problem of food supply. The deficiency could be compensated with food from America. The 
Entente could not continue without American help. Gibb gave a copy of his first memo on the 
food issue to Lloyd George. Gibb did not distribute the other two copies to their recipients 
because Paish ―was not as seriously ill as they had imagined.‖ America joined the war in April 
1917, and ―the entry of the United States went a long way towards the easing of the Allies‘ 
difficulties so far as food was concerned.‖188 
Initially, Paish hoped the League of Nations could help organize economic recovery. In 
1918, he published A Permanent League of Nations, a collection of his lectures from 1917 and 
1918. In it, he stressed the connections between world policy, the League, economic 
interdependence, and international trade. These themes continued to appear in his writings 
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throughout the 1920s and into the Depression. In early 1918, the war was not yet over, and the 
League of Nations had not formed. Paish assumed that America would be in this body. This early 
work revealed his optimism for the world‘s economic potential, but also anticipated the 
difficulties that the postwar world faced. After going through a war to end all wars, he hoped that 
economic necessity would prevent another conflict, much like Norman Angell‘s prewar thesis, 
The Great Illusion.189 In 1910, Angell said a war among the major powers ought to be impossible 
because the economic fallout would be disastrous. World War I proved Angell wrong in 1914, 
and in the decade following the war, the major powers likewise proved Paish wrong. 
 According to Paish, the primary goals of the League were to destroy nationalistic 
militarism and to provide for future economic cooperation. He hoped the League would 
encourage the nations to help each other with the ―the temporary, but dangerous, economic and 
financial problems arising from the war,‖ and by that cooperation ―to exercise greater control 
over the financial and economic consequences of the war, consequences which, if not controlled, 
may prove even more disastrous to mankind than the war itself."
190
 The war had disrupted the 
European economic system, resulting in famine and displacement. The nations needed to plan 
their economic recovery, otherwise economic chaos would manifest itself within a few short 
years.  
 The war had necessitated greater cooperation between the Entente Powers, allowing for 
free trade like never before by removing trade barriers. This process ―created the machinery both 
for obtaining the things they need wherever they can be obtained, and of distributing them 
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according to the needs of each member of the Entente.‖191 The benefits were obvious. He 
optimistically thought that it was impossible ―for the protectionist states to revert to their old 
policies after the experiences they have gained of the supreme advantages of world co-operation, 
both in production and in distribution.‖192 He then condemned any return to self-contained 
economic policy as entirely illogical. Britain could no longer practice isolationism. As the war 
made painfully clear, she could not feed herself solely by her own farms. American grain fed 
Britain during the war, and Paish saw no need for such a good relationship to end with the 
cessation of hostilities.
193
 The Conservative party disagreed; they wished to protect their 
manufacturing interests by only allowing Imperial Free Trade, which prevented tariffs between 
Britain and her colonial empire. Because most of the fighting had happened in France, the 
American and German infrastructures were sound. Wartime production had strengthened their 
economies, and British manufacturers were afraid of the competition‘s ability to undersell them 
on the international market. 
 Paish admonished nations to see the big picture of international trade and mutual benefit. 
Each nation‘s prosperity depended on the ―world's total purchasing power, as well as by its total 
productive power.‖ Removing tariffs and other trade barriers increased overall purchasing 
power. Every country needed to increase production to satisfy greater worldwide demand that 
had resulted from the war. He painted a rosy picture of potential wealth: 
  Their war experience has taught the nations that if in future they pursue a policy of 
 political, economic and financial co-operation, if they stimulate purchasing power by 
 removing restrictions, and if at the same time, they promote a more rapid and vaster 
 production of the unlimited natural wealth with which the world is endowed, then the 
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 reservoir of well-being, not of one or two countries alone, but of all countries will  reach 
 dimensions never hitherto attained or even regarded as attainable.
194
 
 
If cooperation trumped self-interest, the nations could make the world anew after the war. Free 
trade was the best economic stimulus for the recovering world. These measures were absolutely 
necessary, in his view, because of the ―colossal war debts‖ of nations, banks, and businesses. 
When the war ended, payments on debts were due shortly thereafter. Otherwise, ―any breakdown 
of national credit will place world credit in danger, with consequences that cannot be 
measured.‖195 Credit was a temporary measure for recovery, but it ended up becoming the basis 
of the economic system of the 1920s.  
 Paish had risen from obscurity to prominence. Appreciative of the value of hard work and 
education, he honed his skills in economics and writing in the pages of The Statist.  His work on 
British and American railways brought him international recognition, in addition to securing his 
place on the railway committee of the Board of Trade. Brought into more prominent levels of 
government by his friends in the banking sector, Paish provided invaluable assistance to the 
Treasury and David Lloyd George throughout the war, even though it cost him his health and 
possibly his reputation among those who knew of his illness. His recovery brought him to a new 
stage of his life in the post war world. Although he was now about fifty, he continued to travel, 
lecture, and write on how Free Trade could help the world recover from the economic wounds of 
the war. 
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Chapter 2 
The ―Unanswerable Logic‖ of Economics1:  
Reparations, Credit, and Debt in the Post War World 
 
At the end of World War I, Paish was fifty-one with an established reputation as an 
economic statistician, analyst, and author. The expense of World War I had drained Europe‘s 
economies, and Paish saw potentially dire consequences if nations did not carefully rebuild their 
financial systems.  In the decade following the war, Paish attempted to provide advice on 
restoring the stability of international trade and finance. He followed a pattern of meeting with 
policy makers and heads of state; therefore, he probably had a method in his desire to influence 
policy by providing information and analysis.  
To a certain degree, he acted as an ambassador without portfolio: he had no official 
government mission, papers, or position, but he sought to affect other nations‘ international 
policy towards Britain, Free Trade, finance, and tariffs. After 1922, the Liberal party lost its 
place in Parliament to the Conservatives, who advocated Empire Preference and tariffs rather 
than Free Trade; Paish no longer had influence at the top levels of British government. 
Internationally, responses to his proposals varied, but the political and economic leaders of 
Europe and America no doubt heard what he had to say.  
Throughout the 1920s, the issues of reparations, the French occupation of the Rhineland, 
war debt, credit for rebuilding, and agricultural and economic recovery figured prominently in 
Paish‘s writings. As political and economic circumstances changed, his advice altered, but his 
worldview on Free Trade remained consistent. Nonetheless, increasing isolationism hindered 
economic recovery, and at times, Paish appeared to be a voice crying in the wilderness. 
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Post-War Observations on Germany and the Peace (1918-1919) 
 
Paish‘s first attempt at crisis prevention revolved around the Paris Peace Conference. In 
late 1918, Paish sent his ideas on conditions for the Versailles Peace Treaty to both Prime 
Minister Lloyd George and President Wilson.
2
 Paish‘s peace plan included only four points. 
First, Continental questions ought to be settled with fairness to avoid grounds for future conflicts. 
Second, German reparations should be reasonable, meaning, an amount that Germany was able 
to pay.  Paish thought fifty million pounds per annum was a realistic amount for reparations.
3
 
Third, the exiled Kaiser deserved the largest burden of war guilt.
4
 Fourth, Paish favored the 
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4
One of the main problems with reparations was that the German people were held responsible for a war 
that they did not ferment. The Kaiser had abdicated and fled into exile. ―Now the German republic would pay for the 
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creation of the League of Nations to keep international conflicts to a minimum. Paish‘s memoir 
recorded that the reparations were later fixed at 6.6 billion pounds; the annual five percent 
interest and one percent sinking fund (a separate fund for gradual debt remittance) amounted to 
400 million pounds. The annual interest and sinking fund alone were eight times the amount that 
Paish thought reasonable; the total was 132 times more. Paish noted, ―There was absolutely no 
possibility of Germany being able to pay this amount, and I said so plainly.‖5  
Always interested in viewing international economic conditions for himself, Paish had 
the opportunity to lecture soldiers in France and Germany, after the treaty was signed in the 
summer of 1919. On his travels, Paish sometimes had extraneous purposes beside his official 
business. On this trip, he wished to examine the effects of the wartime blockade on the health of 
the German people. He operated out of Cologne, until Major General Malcolm invited him to 
stay in Berlin where Malcolm was Chief of the British Military Mission.
6
 Paish observed that the 
German cities and people were clean with ―few outward signs of poverty,‖ even in the ―slum‖ 
area of Frankfurt. In Berlin, he saw children who appeared to have rickets, a bone condition 
resulting from malnutrition. The boys at a school were all underdeveloped by about three or four 
years. ―Although the war may not have killed the children, the strain of it and the lack of food 
had most certainly prevented them from growing at the rate they should have grown.‖7 The 
markets explained the children‘s condition, as meat was expensive and in short supply.  ―It was 
not a picture to inspire confidence in the minds of those who expected Germany to pay £400 
                                                                                                                                                                    
sins of its imperial predecessor, as it would bear the responsibility for the armistice, the coming peace, and, by 
extension, the loss of the war.‖  Morrow, 287. 
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millions a year in reparations.‖8 With this firsthand knowledge, Paish worked with charity 
groups to alleviate the possibility of starvation among the civilian populations that had already 
suffered so much. 
 
Initial Appeals for American Help (1920-1922) 
 
Paish arrived in America in early January 1920 as a representative of two charitable 
societies concerned with bringing relief to the famine ravaged sections of postwar Europe: the 
Fight the Famine Council and the Vienna Emergency Fund. His total estimates of how much 
money Europe needed for rebuilding and funding war debt were unpopular. The London Times 
headline called it his ―Vast Scheme,‖ while American investors thought the amount of credit 
impossible to provide.
9
 The Times‘ correspondent listed estimated commitments from Americans 
to be around 600 million pounds between private and government credit, which was only twenty 
percent of the figure Paish was proposing for them to give. In an interview, Paish made it clear 
that he was not on official government business, and his estimates were his personal opinion. A 
representative of the War Finance Corporation suggested listing foreign loans on the New York 
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Stock Exchange, but the Times correspondent thought ―gambling‖ on the Exchange would 
simply make matters worse.
10
 Clearly, no easy solution was available. 
 On this same trip, Paish met with Carter Glass, the Secretary of the Treasury, to discuss 
America‘s ability to help Europe, but by the end of the week, Congress had decided not to ratify 
the Versailles Treaty.
 11
 The Senate thought it impractical for America to submit to the League 
and simultaneously become responsible for rebuilding Europe on credit. Glass understood that 
Europe was unable to pay their loans or interest at the time. America was ready to help Europe, 
but only on America‘s terms.12 Paish‘s hopes for the League‘s organization of European 
recovery did not materialize. Europe and America would have to find another way to solve the 
immediate post-war crisis. 
The following week, Paish spoke at the Council of Foreign Relations, only to have his 
proposals summarily rejected by America‘s leading businessmen and bankers. He had reiterated 
his hopes for loans, though he had reduced his total estimate from 7 billion to 4 billion pounds. 
Two other speakers at the meeting, Senator Walter Edge and Herbert Houston objected to a 
government cash loan, but thought goods or private loans were better options. A loan in such a 
large lump sum was not possible, so Edge suggested exchange of goods instead; Houston 
insisted on private loans. However, all the other speakers ―agreed that some action must be 
devised in the interests of American foreign trade to extend credits, but they emphasized also the 
fact that the nations of Europe were showing little or no disposition to decrease their own 
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expenditure after the war.‖13 Additionally, America‘s refusal to join the League of Nations made 
Paish‘s international bonds idea a moot point because the plan required American involvement in 
order to have a solid foundation of credit.  
By the end of the month, The Times said Paish had stopped hoping for an American 
loan.
14
 Although a loan in a lump sum was not forthcoming, he knew credit of some kind had to 
continue to support the people of Europe. American bankers and politicians had listened to 
Paish‘s proposals and rejected it, but this scenario was not entirely surprising. Paish was trying to 
reconcile two opposing groups in order to bring recovery to Europe, but European recovery had 
to take a less direct path than a large loan– through private loans. America and the League of 
Nations had to help Europe, but America was not in the League. Thus, America continued to 
help Europe without the League to organize these financial transfers in any fashion. Private 
credit superseded government loans, as the American government was already withdrawing from 
further involvement with European affairs.  
Thus, Paish began the 1920s meeting with representatives and bankers from America and 
the Continent, which he continued to do throughout the decade. After the price of cotton dropped 
dramatically in 1920-1921, Mr. Boyden, the American Economic Agent in Europe requested 
Paish to visit him in Paris. There, Paish advised a solution for European nations buying 
American cotton on credit and repaying in manufactured textile goods.
15
 Though unsuccessful in 
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orchestrating loans for general European recovery, Paish did have some success in restoring the 
flow of trade between Britain and America in the reciprocal relationship between American 
cotton farmers and British manufacturers. 
 European economies were slow to recover from the various crises the Great War caused 
in agriculture and construction. In 1920, Paish contributed ―The Danger of World Breakdown,‖ 
the first chapter in The Nations and the League.16 In clear language, Paish explained the 
economic situation of Europe following the war. Countries had lost the production power of 
millions of men, and invasion had destroyed or rendered unusable large amounts of agricultural 
and industrial land. Excessive amounts of credit resulted in devalued currencies. Thus, countries 
were unable to buy as much because their cash was worth less. Additionally, countries were 
buying goods on credit, resulting in even higher debts and less cash to pay back.  
Most European governments continued their war time spending habits on what Paish 
deemed ―unproductive purposes.‖17 Nations had fewer products to sell compared to before the 
war because of their diminished resources. This situation affected every nation, so all the nations 
needed to work together in order to reformulate the international economy. Britain was unique in 
that she retained buying and selling power, but could not get them both to work in the same 
market. She was unable to sell to America because of protective tariffs and only bought 
American goods on credit. Britain was unable to export to the continent except by giving 
credit.
18
 This economic cycle was unhealthy, and could not continue indefinitely without doing 
serious damage. 
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 Paish then suggested international loans with low interest and low risk because all nations 
would share the burden. While governments determined the best way to create international 
loans or bonds, Paish said that they needed to guarantee their banks against defaults, thus 
enabling credit to flow temporarily. However, the banks needed to limit credit, in order to control 
inflation. The extension of credit should only be for food, rebuilding industries, and ―the 
restoration of Europe‘s productive power to a level that would remove the necessity for fresh 
credit operations.‖19 Once nations could sustain themselves as they had before the war, then the 
crisis would end. He estimated that Europe could be rebuilt with two billion pounds in ―the form 
of international bonds repayable over a period of 42 years by means of a sinking fund of 1 per 
cent‖ and paid in gold to America.20  
 Such a long term solution was sound advice, but it proved to be politically and socially 
unpopular. In Paish‘s plan, this joint credit would be the responsibility of the League of Nations. 
He understood that nations would hesitate to become liable for the debts of others, but his 
counterargument was ―that the object of credit is to avert a world-wide disaster, which, if it is 
permitted to occur, will destroy the well-being of every nation.‖21 If creditor nations left the 
debtor nations financially weak, the markets for their goods would diminish, ultimately 
damaging them beyond recovery. He estimated that Europe needed a further two billion pounds 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Europe, which before the war was Great Britain‘s greatest market. . . . The British discovered within a few months 
after the signing of the peace treaties that a poverty-stricken continent could not buy.‖ Frederick C. Dietz, An 
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for reconstruction, bringing the total to four billion pounds, not including the war debts of three 
billion pounds owed to America and Great Britain, making the real total seven billion.
22
  
 Paish closed his chapter in The Nations and the League by addressing the issue of 
reparations owed by Germany and Austria. Why should the rest of Europe expect two nations 
already exhausted by war to be able to pay for rebuilding the entire continent? ―If Europe has to 
wait until Germany and Austria can pay then its ruin will be complete.‖23 Based on the recent 
scenario of the Russian Revolution and the precedent that starvation initiated political upheaval, 
Paish warned that political revolutions were possible if the situation continued. Such political 
upheavals did not necessarily occur because sufficient credit and trade prevented starvation, but 
Paish successfully communicated that the situation was serious.
24
 War debts might need to be 
forgiven in order to move forward. He then explained how this affected each nation.
25
 If the 
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League became responsible for ―long term credits,‖ it would serve its purpose to ―promote the 
collective welfare of all peoples.‖26 
 Later in 1920, Paish published a similarly titled article, ―The World Breakdown,‖ in the 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. In his estimation, intelligent 
financial leaders could handle the situation responsibly and avert the danger; alternatively, 
―persons lacking knowledge of fundamental economic conditions‖ would make poor decisions 
which would result in ―a very great disaster.‖27 As later events confirmed, the latter group had 
control. Paish projected a situation where goods waited in storage, separated from consumers 
that needed them – a fundamental problem with trade that occurred during the Great Depression. 
According to Paish, production was down, and distribution was inefficient, but good leadership, 
proper planning, and cooperation could prevent shortages. 
 Paish opened his article by listing the problems facing the world‘s people and economies. 
First, Europe was facing famine, as Russian wheat had fed most of Europe before the war. 
During the war, Russia was unable to feed itself sufficiently, resulting in the Revolution.
28
 All of 
Europe was importing more food than ever before because agricultural production was down an 
                                                   
 
26
 Paish, ―Danger,‖ 39-40. 
 
 
27
 Sir George Paish, ―The World Breakdown,‖ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, Vol. 89, Prices (May, 1920): 219. A recent study by Liaquat Ahamed examined the men in charge of four 
central banks in England, America, France, and Germany during the 1920s. His conclusion is that the Entente 
governments mishandled the Paris Peace Conference and central bankers without economic understanding had 
control of the world‘s markets, ending in disaster. The decision to return to the gold standard at pre-war levels 
prevented economic recovery. The directors of the Bank of England for example controlled the world‘s credit, but 
―they did not pretend to know very much about economics, central banking, or monetary policy.‖ An economist 
charged them with believing ―these were unnecessary.‖ Ahamed, 80, 501-502. In many ways, this retrospective 
analysis confirms the course of mishandled policy that Paish anticipated in 1920 as a potential problem ending in 
crisis. 
 
 
28
 Paish, ―World Breakdown,‖ 219-220. Ian F. W. Beckett stated that new research indicates that 
production actually went up, but insufficient transportation was the real problem. Ian F. W. Beckett, The Great War: 
1914-1918, second edition (New York: Pearson Education Limited, 2007), 512-513. 
 66 
 
average of forty percent. Rationing became necessary to make the current supplies last until the 
next harvest.
29
  
The second problem Paish presented was that a shortage in currency and credit was 
hindering trade. Paish recounted that in the early stages of the Great War, European nations 
obtaining credit from America was not a problem, because America supplied these goods and 
credit as a means to pay back money she owed to European creditors. Upon America entering the 
war, her government took over ―supplying the Entente,‖ which totaled around ten billion 
American dollars by 1918. Europe found herself indebted to America. After the war, the 
American government transferred control of credit to private institutions, which caused the 
problems of 1920, in Paish‘s opinion. These banks were willing to supply only short term credit, 
which the nations of Europe were unable to pay back.
30
 The American government then refused 
to help pay for shipping to export American goods to Europe with government loans. European 
nations thus had no credit to buy and no ability to transport the goods they needed. The Federal 
Reserve had already used the legal limit of credit available to them to help Europe, and it still 
was not enough.
31
  Paish argued that this situation had to change, or world trade would halt.  
 Paish then posited solutions to these challenges. He again suggested that cooperation was 
in the best interest of every nation. Yet he also pointed out the painful irony that nations which 
had banded together to save humanity appeared willing to let saved humanity starve now that the 
war had ended. He again reiterated that the League of Nations was the most logical choice to 
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bring about international cooperation. Compared to what nations had spent each year on the war, 
the amount needed for recovery was less than half as much and would be spread out over a 
period of five or ten years. International tax-free bonds could bring the world safely through, in 
his estimation. The purpose of the League was the preservation of mankind, not only from war, 
but from the famine and political upheaval that potentially resulted from it.
32
 However, 
American isolationism was against involvement in the League, so Paish‘s hopes in its authority 
were misplaced. 
 In July 1922, Paish published another article in the Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science entitled, ―The Rehabilitation of Europe Dependent upon America.‖ 
Since 1918, his economic philosophy had continually become more focused on the benefits of 
international trade and the cooperation it required. Paish explained the economic 
interdependence brought about by technological advances in modern transportation and banking 
necessitated the formation of international credit and exchange. The war had made America a 
―world banker‖ and ―world trader.‖ This was a new role for the United States, and her trading 
habits needed to change with it. Previously, America was a producer; now she needed to be a 
buyer in order to maintain the balance of trade. Paish predicted that if America refused her new 
position and hid in isolationist economics, then her foreign markets would diminish substantially, 
and poverty would result.
33
  
 Paish was spelling out that America‘s economic isolationism had profound consequences 
on Europe. A food shortage was already a problem, and many faced starvation. Economic law 
warned that credit did not work in only one direction for long. America selling at high prices 
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without importing European goods in exchange unbalanced the system. According to Paish, 
―Europe cannot see how it will be possible for her to pay the existing annual sums she owes to 
America‖ with America‘s policy of barring imports. If America became willing to import 
European goods as payment instead of cash, Paish argued that ―the credit situation will at once 
improve.‖34 However, such a system needed a long term payment plan. Short term loans were 
unsustainable with the current faulty system. ―Credits to Europe must be financed by investors 
rather than by bankers, and by securities and good bonds rather than by short bills.‖35 America 
needed to loan roughly four hundred million pounds to Europe every year for the next five years 
for economic recovery, with the understanding that payment would take twenty years or more. 
Thus, since 1920 Paish had reduced his estimates from seven billion to two billion pounds. He 
then suggested that reduced armaments could act as security for the debt as a good faith gesture 
demonstrating aversion to another war.  
 Finally, Paish discussed the issue of reparations. Germany had accepted responsibility, 
but the amount was ―beyond the power of any nation to pay.‖ Such punitive payments only 
hindered recovery, in his opinion. The reparations needed to be adjusted to Germany‘s ability to 
pay, and European nations needed credit because reparations payments would not be 
forthcoming any time soon. This credit would depend on Germany‘s future payments. America 
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needed to ―accept payment for any international credits she may grant in international goods and 
services,‖ because Europe had no other means to pay.36  
 In September of 1922, Paish published an article on Britain‘s debt to America in the 
Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science and Art, a British publication. The Russian Civil 
War had begun before the end of the Great War and continued until 1923. Thus, the supply 
problems were very much the same as in 1920 – without Russian food, Europe was dependent on 
America‘s crops. America was not buying European goods in the same proportion that America 
was selling its own goods to Europe, but rather increasing tariffs to discourage imports. America 
was still granting credit, for they did not accept other options of payment, such as goods, 
services, and tourism. The mounting debt needed to be paid, but the balance of trade did not 
make it appear that such payment would be possible any time soon. Paish thought that the best 
solution was for America to act like Great Britain had when she was the world banker – by being 
open to imports.
37
 
 
Proposals for Helping the Continent (1922-1925) 
 
Paish had attended the Genoa Conference in the spring of 1922, hoping to see a reduction 
in the reparations and to promote free trade. There he met a German diplomat, Count Kessler, 
with whom he discussed the reparations issue. Paish suggested that Germany make a counter 
offer of what they thought they could pay. Kessler visited London a year later, when they 
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renewed their acquaintance at a dinner with the German ambassador.
38
 The first attempt at 
reduction went unnoticed, but after a few months, Paish met with the ambassador in late 1923 
and suggested a new course of action. Germany might ask ―an international banker to examine 
Germany‘s capacity to pay reparations on the basis of how much he would be prepared to lend 
her if there were no reparations.‖ Two weeks later, the ambassador told him to carry out his 
suggestion. Eventually, Paish met with J.P. Morgan, Jr. (―Jack‖), who was vacationing in 
Scotland at the time. Morgan agreed to the idea, provided it had government approval from 
Britain and France. Shortly thereafter, Morgan ―left for the United States, where, through his 
efforts, the Dawes Committee was eventually appointed.‖39 
 The world continued to muddle through the 1920s. After the German mark collapsed 
from hyperinflation, Germany created a new currency, the Rentenmark, which stabilized its 
economy in 1923. The Dawes Commission met in 1924 to reevaluate the question of reparations; 
they reduced the amount Germany owed per year, but Germany was still unable to pay. 
Germany‘s payments to France and Britain came from American credit. Starvation was no longer 
a major threat, but Europe was still dependent on a fantastic amount of American credit.  
 In the summer of 1925, Paish argued for ―Debt Cancellations from an English 
Viewpoint‖ for the American audience of the Annals. He said that during the war, Britain knew 
her contribution to the war effort was mainly fiscal. Policy makers knew that they needed to 
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support Russia to win, and they did not expect to see the loaned money returned. Yet, ―when 
Great Britain came to America to borrow, she did intend to pay.‖ However, America should have 
considered some of the war loans as gifts – their main contribution to the Entente. ―Before the 
war came to an end, I knew that we and our Allies were borrowing more than we could ever pay 
back. . . . But we had to win the war.‖40 While Paish expected Russia to default on its debts, he 
did not expect France to do the same. 
 Paish estimated that France had lost the working power of two million men to death or 
severe wounds. France could not replace the working power of these men, and had yet to admit 
how much the war had incapacitated her. From the 1840s to 1913, France had not industrialized 
like Britain, Germany, and America. France still depended heavily on agriculture and practiced 
an economic self-sufficiency limited to her empire, a situation that was becoming untenable. The 
French had fewer means of producing for the market, in addition to a currency that had lost much 
of its value. They could not pay their debts, interest, sinking fund, and military pensions. As 
France‘s own economic policies were damaging enough, Paish thought it best not to compound 
her problems.  While a radical change in French policy would certainly help, it was unlikely. 
Paish saw the French as captives to policies formulated out of fear – in economics, foreign 
politics, and military defense.
41
 
Paish suggested that many British leaders agreed that the best policy was for America and 
Britain ―to forgive France her debts.‖42 France was practicing great thrift in order to pay her 
debts. By alleviating the need to pay off the debt, France would be free to consume at a normal 
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rate again, and consumption would do the international market more good than repayment.  The 
same principle applied to Italy. If Paish controlled British policy, he would forgive the debts of 
Russia, France, and Italy, but economists were not politicians. He had spent time with the French 
peasants and recorded their limited consumption habits. Whereas a British lady wore a dress for 
six months, a French peasant he spoke with had worn the same dress for more than forty years. 
The frugal French lived on as little as possible, saving to pay off their debts. Paish argued that 
the world needed the French to join the economic market in purchasing to restore the 
international economy.
43
 Paish applied his overarching argument of international cooperation to 
the international market in 1925. Creditors in Britain and America needed to release the French 
from this debtors‘ prison where all her work went to pay her debts. 
 Not only did French economic policy need to change, but their policy toward Germany 
needed to change also. The Dawes Commission had reduced the amount in reparations that 
Germany was to pay annually, but the Commission said ―that if they had fixed the amount of 
reparations at the figure that the experts believe that Germany could pay, it would be so small no 
one would accept the decision.‖44 Germany might try to pay, but the mark was not in a good 
position for exchange, so France would not receive the amount she was expecting. Thus, France 
would be entitled to continue its occupation of the Rhineland, as the Versailles Treaty 
stipulated.
45
 Paish suggested the following line of action: a new commission to recalculate how 
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much Germany could pay in reparations, France to accept that smaller amount and to leave the 
Rhineland to avoid another land dispute and potential cause for war, America and Britain to 
forgive France‘s debts upon their completing the previous action, and the French Empire to 
remove tariffs so as to provide a market for the incredible amount of manufactured goods that no 
one was buying.
46
 Debt forgiveness would help reset the market. Combined with tariff removal, 
Paish hoped that Free Trade would take over, and recovery would come. 
 Paish‘s conclusion was unusually pessimistic: ―I do not believe the world can recover 
from the present situation, I do not believe we can get even a reasonable amount of reparations 
out of Germany, I do not believe that we can restore Europe, I do not believe that the world‘s 
income can be increased or the other nations that owe Europe such great sums of money can 
pay,‖ except by a slow increase in revenue and purchasing power.47 Debt was preventing that 
expansion; forgiving the debts would enable the nations to buy. Paish explained that protective 
tariffs between the nations stifled trade and prevented recovery: ―We are all strangling each 
other.‖48 His estimate was that this course of action would not be considered or practicable until 
time proved the recommendations of the Dawes Commission. In a few years, the problems of 
reparations, war debts, disarmament, security, and tariff policy would become completely 
untenable, and perhaps then the nations would be willing to have a conference that would make 
real changes. Paish realized that policy was not changing, and current trends would eventually 
result in disaster.  
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Proposal for Free Trade as Crisis Prevention (1925-1927) 
 
 Concerned by the state of trade on the continent, Paish and four friends formed the 
London Free Trade Committee in 1925.
49
 The following year, the group wrote a ―plea to remove 
the fiscal barriers‖ and tariffs that were limiting trade and preventing Germany from paying its 
reparations. The Committee submitted it to Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England, 
who made some alterations before signing it. ―Next it was signed by Lord Rothschild, the 
Barings, and the Chairmen of the ‗Big Five‘.‖50 Paish went to the Continent to obtain more 
signatures and to promote Free Trade. He failed to obtain a signature from the Bank of France, 
but he succeeded in attending a French Free Trade conference in Paris. Paish continued to 
Switzerland, where he visited the League of Nations and attended another conference that agreed 
the tariffs needed to come down.
51
  
Continuing his journey down into Italy, he met with Mussolini‘s adviser Signor 
Pantaleoni and the British ambassador in order to arrange a meeting with Mussolini himself.  He 
proposed an Italian Free Trade committee to promote tariff removal on the continent. Mussolini 
promised ―to consider the matter,‖ but was not interested.52 Mussolini‘s Fascism restricted 
individual liberty, and Mussolini said that ―Liberalism is on the point of closing the doors of its 
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deserted temple,‖ in the early 1930s.53 Paish‘s political and economic philosophy was 
diametrically opposed to Mussolini‘s. 
After brief stops in Eastern Europe, Paish went to Germany. Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, head 
of the Reichsbank, signed the plea in response to a letter from Norman, but Paish went to Berlin 
to meet with a leader of the Weimar Republic. ―I went to see the Reich Chancellor and found 
that though he personally was in favour of Free Trade, he could do nothing about it.‖54 Paish also 
stopped in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Belgium. Only after every major banker in Europe 
had signed the Plea did the French agree to join them, with a note of qualification. The 
Committee then published their manifesto in 1926. ―By that time it could really be said to 
contain the name of every great bank in Europe and of the leading industrialists as well.‖55 Aside 
from the bankers‘ signatures, Paish felt that his trip had born little fruit. Most nations were 
retreating into self-sufficiency rather than bringing their tariffs down. ―It is possible, however, 
that my visits may have induced Sir Montagu Norman to assist Germany by making loans, and 
thus alleviated the trade position.‖56 Paish had completed his Free Trade embassage to the 
Continent. He was always heard, but did not find much acceptance there. 
 In 1927, Paish published The Road to Prosperity, his first book in nearly a decade. It was 
published in two different editions in England and America. In The Road to Prosperity, he 
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offered much different advice from his calls for loans in 1920. By this time credit was out of 
control, and the need was for real income. Despite the amount of credit in circulation, 
―production and markets are still completely disorganised.‖57 However, if credit stopped, 
purchasing power would suffer to the point where everyone was just getting by, and countries 
might start asking for payment on debts. That scenario would result in ―a world crisis of 
unprecedented proportions.‖58 Indebtedness had become a universal problem. By giving credit 
that debtors did not repay, merchants found themselves in debt and their businesses in danger of 
bankruptcy. The creditors gave money to make money, but had no ability to collect the loans. 
Government interference only served to make matters worse by increasing the money supply, 
devaluing their currencies, or protecting home industries with tariffs that stifled international 
trade. Paish said the solution lay in finding a way to expand buying power and real income.
 59
  
 Paish then summarized how the nations came to this position and why this crisis did not 
compare to any preceding one. Economically, war served no purpose but to spend much capital 
without any productive return on the investment; nations spent large sums of money to destroy 
the economies of their enemies. Production of real income went down during the war, which 
made adjusting to a productive peace time economy difficult.
60
 Reparations prevented some 
nations from an otherwise normal recovery because goods that were once a source of profit had 
become payment for a colossal debt. Paish also observed that the creditor nations of Britain and 
France had become debtors to America, exacerbating the problem.
61
 The war had connected the 
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nations‘ economies in an unprecedented way, so when any one of them was not functioning 
properly, the rest suffered.  
 Such an unprecedented crisis required an innovative solution before the potential dangers 
became actual.
 62
 If real income did not expand, then ―the situation will adjust itself by a process 
of insolvency and liquidation which will reduce expenditure to the level of the present attenuated 
income, a process which will involve great suffering to many nations.‖63 The natural defensive 
tendency of reverting to self-sufficiency was limiting the expansion of real income.  Selling on 
the free market was the best way for income to grow. Paish used Great Britain‘s colossal growth 
in the late nineteenth century as an example of the best way for income to grow and how it 
benefited all nations. The income to pay debts and right the world‘s economy could only come 
―by removing every obstacle to production and to international exchange.‖64 The nations had to 
stop treating the market like a war zone and make it a place for cooperation. 
 Paish then analyzed the financial situation of the world‘s leading nations with suggestions 
as to what each one must do in order to avoid catastrophe. Starting with America, he said that the 
United States had become the creditor of the world, having loaned more than four billion pounds 
to the war-torn countries of Europe. America was receiving payment in goods instead of interest; 
she also possessed more than half the world‘s gold reserves. If Europe‘s buying power gave way, 
American companies would lose their buyers, and a massive economic failure would result.
65
 
The credit system was becoming increasingly fragile. If Europe stopped buying, then the 
American market would be glutted with excess goods and raw materials. Europe‘s debt ought to 
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preclude further borrowing; America‘s market for her goods was shrinking. The more America 
loaned, the worse the result would be.
66
  
 America had to let other nations exchange goods as a means of payment on the loans and 
interest. ―Unless steps are taken to enable the world to pay America for her products and her 
interest, there will be a complete collapse both in Europe‘s buying power and in America‘s 
selling power involving a financial crisis in the United States far more severe than any crisis 
America has yet experienced.‖67 The looming depression and unemployment that would plague 
Europe would reverberate in America if the situation did not change. American prosperity was 
unsustainable in a world ―overwhelmed by debt.‖ American policy was the determining factor, 
and it was not improving the situation at the time.
68
 
 In the American edition, George Roberts, former director of the United States Mint, 
wrote the foreword to The Road to Prosperity with his analysis of the situation. In October 1926, 
the London Free Trade Committee‘s published their plea with bankers‘ signatures from sixteen 
countries.
69
 Roberts said that these men do not typically comment on policy matters, so the fact 
that they joined together for a public declaration was significant.
70
 As tariffs were damaging 
international trade, Roberts suggested leaving the market alone and allowing the system to 
regulate itself. Governments did not understand business and would only make a mess of trying 
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to regulate international commerce.
71
 Paish had pointed out similar economic errors in his other 
publications. 
 Roberts and Paish operated on the idea that Free Trade facilitated cooperation, but tariffs 
and self-sufficiency engendered trade barriers and lowered income. According to Roberts, 
isolationist policy proceeded from the faulty idea that self-sufficiency brought economic 
advantage.
72
 The plea stated that recovery depended on changed thinking, ―trade is not war but a  
process of exchange,‖ and the prosperity of the customers was the foundation for the prosperity 
of the seller.
73
 Roberts did not think the situation necessarily as dire as Paish did, but he agreed 
that the current situation was unsustainable. 
Reviewers praised the work for its clarity and overall position on free trade. However, 
fellow economist R. F. Harrod thought Paish‘s prophecies of disaster were a bit much. Although, 
Harrod concluded that because Paish‘s goals of expanding free trade were beneficial, ―he may be 
forgiven his over-confidence in the prophecy of evil.‖74 Economist and Oxford fellow L. L. Price 
recognized Paish‘s reputation as a skilled statistician and praised the book‘s value in creating a 
picture of the world‘s economy as a whole. However, Price noted that other economists did not 
agree with everything in the book. Price said a determining factor in the economic future was 
how long America would continue to loan without repayment.
75
 Economists hoped for a 
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cancellation of debts to help Europe move forward; otherwise, they saw America as 
Shakespeare‘s Shylock, determined for the debtor to pay a pound of flesh.  
 Thus, Paish visited America in 1927 to have his book published there in addition to 
lecturing on America‘s role in world finance and trade. As usual, Paish went to Washington 
shortly after his arrival. ―My first visit was to President Coolidge at the White House, and from 
him I received a very warm welcome and a full understanding of my plan.‖ Secretary of 
Commerce Herbert Hoover met with Paish immediately afterward. They talked for two hours, 
and then agreed to spend a weekend together with a mutual friend – Mr. Baron of the Wall Street 
Journal. Paish ―thought it was an excellent opportunity for us to discuss the whole question 
beginning to end. . . . I did everything in my power to induce America – through [Hoover] – to 
reduce or abolish her tariff. But all to no avail. [Hoover‘s] final words to me were: ‗Don‘t worry 
about all these loans being granted.‘‖76 Hoover expected a short-term crisis in American 
business. He was confident that America would continue lending, not realizing how close the 
crisis was. Paish thought that if Hoover had removed tariff barriers after his election, the crisis 
might not have happened.
77
  
 Later in 1927, Paish published an article reviewing the position of ―The World Economic 
Conference.‖ The nations had failed to let their principles match their ideals. They had created a 
League of Nations, symbolizing their connections and interdependence, but they practiced 
economically independent policies of self-sufficiency. Political nationalism had resulted in a 
colossal war; economic nationalism had the potential to result in worldwide economic 
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breakdown with worse results. Policy had not caught up with the economic reality. The 
overextension of credit could only last so long. ―It is now of supreme importance for the nations 
to realise without further delay the gravity of the situation in which they are placing 
themselves.‖78 More credit was not the answer. Paish saw that the only way out was through 
allowing goods and services to replace cash as payment. It was the only way for the nations to 
pay their debts and reparations.
79
   
 Wall Street crashed in October 1929, following a decline in business and the bursting of 
the speculation bubble that occurred in late summer.
80
 America had loaned money to Germany to 
pay for rebuilding and reparations. Germany gave that borrowed money to pay reparations to 
France and Britain. France and Britain then funneled the money back to America. The nations 
were not creating new income; they were simply passing credit around. Their financial destinies 
were inextricably connected. American speculation on the stock market had stimulated inflation, 
and short term loans disappeared. Credit‘s circular flow from America to Europe and back 
stopped, severely diminishing the daily operations of international exchange.  
 Sir George Paish‘s advice changed as the conditions worsened or changed. At first he 
advised a large floating loan secured by the League of Nations. Americans rejected this proposal 
as untenable. Loans continued to come in a haphazard manner. After the Dawes Commission 
issued their report in 1924, his advice altered. France and Germany had restored their 
infrastructure and industry, but were still unable to pay debts and reparations. He suggested that 
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if the creditor nations forgave these debts, the world economy would be back on track, similar to 
how things were before the war. He could not prevent the Great Depression, but his writings 
prove that he and other economists recognized the economic system‘s persisting problems from 
an early date. The financial futures of all the leading nations were tied together, and credit was 
out of control.  The Great Depression had a devastating psychological effect on businessmen, 
and fiscal confidence was lost. The crisis had come, yet Paish still believed in his Liberal Free 
Trade philosophy. The nations must trust each other enough to take down their trade barriers and 
cancel debts that could not be paid. Such trust turned out to be delicate, and the 1930s did little to 
build that trust.      
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Chapter 3 
The ―Unwelcome Truth‖ of ―Unprecedented Danger‖1:  
The Great Depression and World War II 
 
From the earliest years of the twentieth century, Paish had visited America with 
frequency. Many politicians, bankers, and economists received him warmly as he spoke at a 
variety of conferences and meetings. Yet in 1940, after a relatively short visit, members of 
Congress were calling for his deportation, and the British embassy was also requesting him to 
leave the country.
2
 Paish‘s conversation with isolationist Senator Burton Wheeler on America‘s 
policy towards Hitler had gone poorly, as Wheeler misinterpreted Paish‘s request for American 
help with a call to arms. Whether out of innocence, pride, obstinacy, or righteous indignation, 
Paish refused to leave, staying until the end of 1942 – long enough to see Japan bring America 
into the war.
3
 Events often had a way of justifying Paish‘s economic and political arguments.  
 
Proposal for Recovery – A Global Worldview of Economic Policy (1931-1934) 
 
The Depression was not only a staggering economic blow, but a psychological one as 
well. Businessmen had lost confidence, but Paish continued to promote the Free Trade solution. 
Apparently The Road to Prosperity had reached its desired audience, as Paish recalled that his 
American publishing company, G. P. Putnam‘s Sons, requested another book from him at 
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Franklin Delano Roosevelt‘s recommendation. Paish came to America with his book in April, 
1931, which was published shortly thereafter.
4
  
In The Way to Recovery, Paish reiterated many of the same themes in stating the nature of 
the economic crisis as he had in the 1920s.
5
 Paish again argued for international cooperation in 
Free Trade. The burden of reparations was detrimental to the German economy, which adversely 
affected France and England as well. France and England could not pay their war debts to 
America in gold; debts had to be paid in goods or cancelled. Paish stated that changing attitudes 
and policies was the remedy to the present crisis. He explained that the need for confidence 
predicated any recovery, but such a transformation was dependent on altered trade policies and 
mutual support.
6
 A disposition of cooperation based on the assurance of peace would help. The 
nations‘ politics did not fit with the economic practices of exchange and credit.7 The world‘s 
governments needed to take ―immediate action,‖ yet they had disregarded the advice of the 
World Economic Conference that the League of Nations organized in1927.
8
  
 Paish proposed a new meeting that would include statesmen dedicated to implementing 
the necessary reforms. Leaders needed to gather and lay aside national self-interest to work for 
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the recovery of all.
9
 Paish then suggested remedies that such a convention would advise. A 
change of attitude necessitated the following four international conditions: political stability, an 
agreement to work for the common welfare, policy adjustment, and international conflict 
resolution.
10
 In Paish‘s opinion, the League of Nations would become more effective if America 
and Russia joined.
11
 The solutions proposed were the same as Paish had already argued – 
cancellation of reparations and war debts and the removal of trade barriers would return 
prosperity to the nations.
12
 
Shortly after arriving in America, Paish was again presenting a paper at the annual 
meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
13
 He focused on America‘s 
tariff policy, which he thought was damaging economic recovery. He began by examining the 
nature of the problem, by stating that all nations were in economic trouble. More than a decade 
after World War I had ended, and yet ―the disorganization of business due to the War‖ was still a 
problem; Paish attempted to explain why. The world had applied ―the wrong remedies and 
[made] a very grave situation infinitely graver.‖ All the attempts of the 1920s had only 
postponed the inevitable. The creditor nations‘ policies prevented payment of debts, resulting in 
financial insolvency for the debtors. ―The situation we are facing today is world bankruptcy.‖ 14 
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The amount of credit American banks were able to give had more than tripled since the war 
began, and the American people were in a serious amount of debt to the banks.
15
 
 To substantiate his case, Paish asked his audience to remember their history from the 
previous century. America had grown rapidly in population and prosperity over the past century 
because European immigrants had settled and built farms across America‘s vast territory. He 
argued that transportation and credit had made such growth in labor and production possible. 
―Make trade possible, and trade will flow. You made it possible by building railways, and also 
by an act of great wisdom. Under your Constitution you were not allowed to put on tariffs among 
the various states. . . . Imagine such an arrangement in any other part of the world!‖ The 
interstate commerce of the forty-eight states was ―the greatest free trade area in the world. This 
policy . . . caused expansion as no other policy could have.‖16  
Paish then moved from America‘s nineteenth century prosperity to similar progress 
around the world. Technological advancements in communication and transportation removed 
the ―physical obstacles to trade,‖ and growth went on wonderfully until 1914. Trade bound the 
nations together in dependence, which was why war, ―is not only unnecessary – it is criminal. 
The nations ought to have known . . . that any injury to any nation would injure the whole.‖ 17 
Britain had created a world market of free trade through importing the goods of other nations and 
by helping other nations establish profitable industries. ―Great Britain‘s action in abolishing 
tariffs benefited both herself and the rest of the world.‖18 Paish continued by giving the statistics 
of British economic growth for the seventy years preceding the war.  Exports went up almost 
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seven hundred percent, and imports increased almost eight hundred percent. With such examples 
he connected his argument to a Biblical principle, ―Am I not justified in drawing the conclusion 
that the nation that will give its life shall save it, and the nation that will save its life shall lose it? 
Great Britain has given her life with great courage‖ by removing tariffs.19 According to Paish, 
Bismarck‘s economic policy against Russia and Germany‘s desire for self-sufficiency created the 
Franco-Russian alliance.
20
  ―In my judgment, the War was the direct result of the fears of the 
German statesmen for their future . . . Had Germany trusted her future to the world, there never 
would have been that great war, and Germany today would be infinitely more prosperous than 
she is.‖21  
 After examining the evidence of prosperity from the previous century, the solution to the 
current world debt and trade imbalance was obvious to Paish. ―Trade will expand in proportion 
as we give facilities for it.‖ Free Trade always resulted in growth. At this point in the Depression, 
trade barriers were continuing to go up, which only served to make matters worse. The World 
Economic Conference of 1927 that Paish had written on before had agreed unanimously ―that the 
tariff policy of the world was the disturbing element; that instead of promoting trade it was 
reducing it; and that there must be tariff reduction. . . . [T]ariff policy did not lead to prosperity 
but to great poverty and war.‖ In another ominous prophecy, he said, ―If this tariff situation is not 
corrected there will be another world war, more deadly and infinitely more dreadful than the last. 
Europe is being forced into poverty, and will not submit to it easily. . . .The trend of events is 
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leading not only to financial trouble but also to political trouble.‖22 Paish quoted a late friend of 
his, Dr. Walter Leaf, Chairman of the Westminster Bank, who said that the success of bad trade 
policy meant ―the suicide of Europe.‖23 
 Paish pled with his American audience: ―The world needs your produce and wants to buy 
from you; it is in debt to you and wants to pay you. You raise your tariff and prevent the world 
from buying your products and from paying its debts to you, thus driving it into bankruptcy.‖ 24 
Removing trade barriers and tariffs would allow the market to stabilize and goods to move more 
easily. ―The time has come when this policy is essential. We have no option; the pressure of 
circumstances is so powerful that we must adopt it or perish.‖25 Hope was still present, and 
prosperity was possible if the nations freed trade from its prison of tariffs.  
Paish wanted the nations to lay down their arms and create their economic policies on the 
assumption of peace. The Great War was not the war to end all others; therefore, such a policy 
was perhaps naively idealistic. One newspaper article argued, ―Sir George Paish indulges in a 
beautiful dream when he advocates the universal removal of tariffs and the cancellation of all 
debts. It is a dream that can not [sic] become a reality.‖ 26 Paish was an idealist in many ways, 
but he was not alone in his hope for peace. After the unparalleled suffering caused by the Great 
War, most Europeans did not think another major continental conflict was possible. 
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 Roosevelt‘s election in 1932 encouraged Paish that Free Trade might return to America. 
At Roosevelt‘s recommendation, Paish came to America in 1934 to speak at the Council of the 
Churches in San Francisco in addition to engagements in the Midwest.
27
 Roosevelt‘s Secretary of 
Agriculture, Henry Wallace, was actively promoting Free Trade. Paish expressed his approval 
upon meeting Wallace in Washington. Wallace ―laughed my words away by [saying]: - ‗Of 
course you are pleased. [The speeches] are your own!‘‖28 
 During Paish‘s visit, he gave an impromptu address to the Academy of Political Science 
entitled ―Commercial Policy and the Gold Standard.‖29 While Paish had favored the creation of 
the Federal Reserve Bank, his address expressed serious disapprobation toward the policies of 
the American financial system regarding how the gold standard worked. America had the 
problem backwards. Gold was a means, not an end. ―Gold is the servant of trade and trade is the 
essential factor. If you trade, and pursue the policy that will promote trade, gold will take care of 
itself.‖30 Paish then explained how Britain had financed much of the world‘s trade and 
investments – about two billion pounds or ten billion dollars – on half of one percent of that 
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figure stockpiled in gold – ten million pounds.31 Gold was a commodity to be sold and 
exchanged like any other; more than the amount he mentioned came in and out of the country, 
but the permanent reserve was not very large. 
 America and France had created problems by stockpiling gold – America deprived the 
world of its assets, while France purposely devalued its currency. Both of these problems 
represented a fundamental misunderstanding, according to Paish: ―With the gold standard in 
operation as it should be, gold isn‘t intended to be retained by any one country.‖32 Gold retention 
prevented proper finance and trade, because gold needed to be used, not hoarded.  America had 
made this fatal misstep when given the majority of the world‘s gold reserves as a result of World 
War I. By refusing goods and services as payment, America had ―bankrupted the world.‖ He 
urged them to follow Britain‘s example from history: maintain the gold standard ―by holding 
only a relatively small quantity of gold at the world center.‖33 France had devalued their currency 
and stockpiled gold. When gold failed to circulate, trade and investment faced difficulty. These 
policies left nations in debt because they had no gold left to pay with, and goods and services 
were not alternative forms of payment. ―France and America . . . must realize that the gold 
standard, or any international currency system, depends upon the interchange of goods and 
services. Those are the fundamental things, not gold.‖34 
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The following month, Paish gave another more formal address on nationalism and 
internationalism to the same society‘s annual meeting in Philadelphia.35 In it, he presented a 
global worldview based on business principles, morality, and political necessity. Mutual 
suspicion and xenophobia were leading the nations of the world into isolationism, which Paish 
found untenable for sustaining a global economic market.
36
 Seeking prosperity for the whole 
world would result in economic cooperation rather than isolationist protection. Protective tariffs 
were stifling trade, prolonging the Depression.
37
 
 Paish built his case for an internationalist outlook on the premise that nationalism and 
internationalism were complementary, rather than opposing, views. The duties of responsible 
citizenship was not limited to their nation, but included the world as well. The economic growth 
of America had brought prosperity to other nations. Modern transportation and travel had 
connected the economic destinies of the nations.
38
  
His first argument was that of political necessity. Citizens of the world sent 
representatives to the League of Nations, a ―world parliament.‖ But America and Russia had not 
joined this body, weakening its influence. He knew America was not interested, but ―the 
situation is so grave that the truth is essential whether it is welcome or unwelcome. The very fact 
that America is out of the League is helping to promote world disorder, bringing visibly nearer 
the danger of another war.‖39 He countered the argument that America‘s place in the League 
would obligate her to make war with the assertion that America‘s presence in the League would 
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prevent that war from happening. Strong central governments maintain peace within a country, 
and theoretically, in the world as well. Without America, another war was all but inevitable, in 
Paish‘s opinion. He explained they did not understand the toll the last war had exacted on the 
civilian populations of Europe. No one in Europe wanted to live through that again. 
―Nevertheless another war is approaching. Mr. Hitler is training the German people for war; the 
Japanese are assembling great war forces in Manchuria. Why? Because the League is not strong 
enough to secure justice.‖40 
 Economic necessity formed the core of his second argument. America‘s unemployment 
rate was partially linked to the decline in international trade. As much as they might not wish to 
admit it, the world market had driven their prosperity.  Cooperation was not ―merely altruism, it 
is realism‖ and good business sense.41 America‘s productive capacity was greater than the home 
market could consume; in five years, their income had dropped by half from a reduction in 
foreign trade. Debts could not be repaid without an expansion in income; government 
redistribution of income was a quick fix that treated a symptom without solving the real problem. 
Even Great Britain had fallen into the protectionist mindset of Empire preference because of the 
high tariff walls elsewhere. Britain could not sell on the world market, and thus could not buy 
from America either.
42
 Britain‘s trade balance with America also affected France and Belgium 
adversely.  
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 Paish concluded with a short moral argument based on the golden rule and Jesus‘ 
teaching on futile self-preservation.  
All the forces of circumstances, our minds, even our faith, tell us that a nationalistic 
policy is the wrong policy. We know that we are breaking that divine law which 
commands us to do unto others as we would they should do unto us. And we know that 
we have forgotten that ―He that will save his life shall lose it, and he that will give his life 
for the cause of righteousness shall save it.‖ The nations are trying to save their lives and 
are losing them. Let us. . .be willing to give our lives for what is right, and then our 
nations will be saved.
43
  
A nation of Christians was responsible to do all they could to remedy matters.
44
Wrong thinking 
was perpetuating unwise actions. Paish warned that only by willingly taking her place as a world 
political and economic leader could America help turn the tide of disaster. Europe was not strong 
enough to accomplish it without her help. Paish was trying to coax them out of the mindset of the 
Monroe Doctrine and bring them into the world arena. 
 
Proposal for Recovery – Strengthening the League of Nations (1934-1936) 
 
He returned to England, and was shortly thereafter having lunch with the Russian 
ambassador, Ivan Maisky.
45
 The ambassador was trying to assess Britain‘s diplomatic position 
should Germany and Japan attack his country. Paish affirmed Britain‘s neutrality and freedom to 
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sell supplies to either side, remembering that Britain had aided Japan in the Russo-Japanese War 
in 1904. He countered this possibility with the suggestion that Russia joined the League of 
Nations, as ―‗Great Britain could not supply munitions to any agressor [sic] state.‘‖46 Paish then 
went to Professor Gilbert Murray, a prominent Liberal intellectual and author, at the League of 
Nations Union. Murray wrote to a French minister to facilitate Russia‘s entrance into the 
League.
47
  
 In 1935, Mussolini invaded Abyssinia – modern day Ethiopia. Ever watchful of world 
affairs, Paish wrote a series of letters to the editor of the Times. His first letter gave an economic 
explanation for Italy‘s policy – they needed a market for their goods and a source of raw 
materials. However, since Italy was in financial trouble already, taking on further trouble through 
invading another country would not help their plight. He suggested the leading world powers 
provide Italy with alternatives – for Italy to use a different colony already under their control or 
for the nations to work together for a stronger currency and lower tariffs to expand the market. 
As ever, Paish wanted the policy makers to try to fix the actual problem rather than merely 
looking at the symptoms.
48
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 Paish‘s next letter was a collaborative effort of the Abyssinia Association, of which he 
was chairman.
49
 The Ethiopian Emperor had fled the country in hopes of securing diplomatic 
support. The Association declared, ―To allow Italy to annex Abyssinia would be not merely to 
destroy all confidence in international law, but to create many grave problems.‖50 Stricter 
sanctions against Italy might force them to reconsider. Public opinion in Britain and France 
objected to Mussolini‘s actions, but the governments did not do anything. The Association hoped 
that ―the aggressor may be prevented from reaping the fruits of his aggression, while the victim   
. . . may be restored and enjoy effective protection in future.‖51 
 The following month, Paish sent another letter on the Ethiopian situation. If the 
government failed to understand the reasons behind Italy‘s invasion, then ―a still more dangerous 
situation than the one we are now facing will inevitably arise.‖52 Paish thought that economic 
distress propelled the invasion, but Mussolini did not realize that his conquest was a drain on 
resources. Additionally, the investment required to reap economic rewards was a process that 
would take many years. Italy‘s blatant disregard for the League of Nations and the Kellogg Pact 
―has created grave anxiety lest collective engagements for the maintenance of peace should 
prove illusory. And this anxiety affects not only the political but the economic outlook inasmuch 
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as economic restoration waits upon political stability.‖53 Letting Italy get away with its unlawful 
invasion would only make world affairs worse, further hindering economic recovery. Paish 
reiterated that non-intervention would merely solidify the trend toward isolationism, which 
would have the same result of stagnant foreign trade. In keeping with his global outlook, Paish 
saw that the fates of other nations were at stake in this question, not just those of Italy and 
Ethiopia.
54
  
 
Failure of Recovery – Omens of War (1936-1939) 
 
 Late in 1936, Paish returned to America with a new book for publication, The Way Out.55 
He had a lecture similarly titled ―The World Situation and the Way Out,‖ which he presented 
before the annual meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
56
 They 
published the address in the summer of 1937. He began without any equivocation, ―The world 
situation is one of unprecedented danger.‖57 While he had said similar things regarding economic 
difficulties, he reinforced this statement with a panorama of world conflict: German conscription 
and occupation of the Rhineland, Italy‘s invasion of Abyssinia, the Spanish Civil War supplied 
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with weapons by Germany and Italy, and the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and China.
58
 In a 
sense, the world was already at war. The financial situation was not much better. The 
governments of leading nations were going into debt in order to employ their people and give 
them purchasing power. Such recovery measures were artificial, but necessary to prevent 
starvation and its offspring, political revolution. Another war was all but inevitable, and Paish 
feared it would be more devastating than the previous one.
59
 
 The way out of this dire world circumstance was a broader outlook. Rather than seeking 
self-interest, individuals and nations needed to understand that ―no man is an island.‖60 
Prosperity would return ―by promoting the common welfare instead of seeking our own self-
interest at the expense of others!‖61 Recognition of interdependence and a return to Free Trade 
would bring more nations into cooperation than enmity. He pointed to the abundance of natural 
resources and modern inventions that had brought the world together – the two should have 
resulted in prosperity for all. If only the nations could confer together in the interest of 
preservation, then maybe they could avoid another war.
62
 However, this suggestion of world 
peace seemed out of place when Germany, Italy, and Japan were attempting to advance their 
economies through invading neighboring territory.   
 Paish then directed his attention to China as a recent case to illustrate his point; this was 
not mere economics or politics – it was moral. Chinese women were abandoning their children 
because of the famine, ―And no one is doing anything about it. Christian people here in 
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America‖ and in England were ―just answering that such distress is inevitable.‖63 China would 
not have been in such distress if the Western world had sought to expand trade relations there – 
to invest in railways to open such a large country. To objections that China was not their 
responsibility, Paish countered that American missions work in China dismantled any such 
claim. America accepted spiritual responsibility, but not physical.  
They are the children of the Great Father, the same as you are, and how dare we meet him 
when our day comes if we have neglected those people- have allowed those women to 
throw their babies out because they have no food? Do you realize that this world is God‘s 
world, that he has made it, that he has given us wealth beyond anything we could 
conceive? The Chinese are in need of it. The children are dying of starvation. My God! 
When I think of it, I am appalled.
64
 
 
In a tone of heart break and outrage, Paish continued his address. Unimportant domestic affairs 
preoccupied the nations while the world slipped into devastation. Paish‘s remedy required 
repentance followed by a commitment to changed thinking and appropriate accompanying 
action.
65
 
 In Paish‘s opinion, the economic situation was behind Germany‘s militarism. They could 
not sell abroad, so they could not purchase. Therefore, they sought new territory for raw 
materials and markets. The German people were culpable for electing Hitler, ―a man of no 
understanding, who thinks he can get anything he wants by force and by force alone . . . Let him 
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also repent.‖66 The agreement between Japan and Germany was dangerous, probably leading to 
an invasion of Russia. France‘s alliance with Russia provided the necessity of a two front war, 
but Germany facilitated the Spanish Civil War to give France something to worry about. World 
war was coming.
67
 Cooperation was essential, but Paish did not expect his audience to take his 
word for it. He merely hoped to get them thinking.
68
 
The introduction to The Way Out repeated the first half of his address to the Academy.  
Paish‘s remedies revolved around the widespread failure to appreciate the gravity of the world‘s 
problems. He recounted the effects of World War I, the expansion of American credit, the 
problem of tariffs, and the abandonment of the gold standard.
69
 Policy makers had failed to 
rectify the world situation because they had treated the problem with temporary solutions – 
focusing on the symptoms rather than the causes. The worldwide problem required a multi-
national solution.
70
  
So far, the nations‘ various attempts at recovery had failed. The war that Germany and 
Italy seemed to be seeking would only make matters worse. Neither was isolationism a solution, 
as America and Britain should have known; the problem of periodic crop failure that every 
nation suffered was enough evidence to rule isolationism a dangerous prospect. An isolated 
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country with a bad farming season could starve.
71
 Political revolution or trusting a ―superman‖ 
dictator was foolish as well.
72
 
According to Paish, the real problem was mental as much as material. Fear was crippling 
the nations; retreating into isolationism was unwise policy. ―Excessive fear causes nations to 
suffer from the madness of delusion just as it causes individuals to go crazy, and to act in a 
manner that tends to create the conditions of which they are afraid,‖ in a self-fulfilling prophecy 
of despair.
73
 The deep fears that World War I occasioned led to policies enacted out of fear that 
only compounded the problem. This was the reason behind the harsh penalties against Germany 
at Versailles, high tariffs, and misled banking and government policy. A new outlook was the 
first step: ―Courage and confidence must be the mental qualities of governments and of peoples – 
not fear and distrust if the difficulties confronting all nations are to be overcome.‖74 
 This was not the failure of capitalism, as many claimed. Rather, Paish pointed out that 
capitalism worked just fine for decades until World War I interfered. The problem lay more in 
government economic policy following the strain that any such conflict would have caused. 
Twenty years of bad policy had changed the system, and not for the better. "The system now in 
operation is not the capitalist system, it is a system of government control of the business 
machine in all countries, a control for which governments have had no training and of which 
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they have little or no understanding.‖75 Political expediency often trumped concern for the 
general welfare. 
 The rest of the book dealt with international affairs, the gold standard, currency 
devaluation, credit, agriculture, and colonialism. Paish then gave suggestions to each of the 
leading nations on what they needed to do to help the rest of the world return to economic 
stability. The international outlook and a new mindset of cooperation would go a long way. The 
current crisis required not ―physical courage, which the peoples possess in super-abundance, but 
moral courage – the courage to stand for what is just and generous and for the common good.‖76 
Just as men asked for the help of the ―All Powerful‖ in times of danger, so should the people of 
the world ―pray to the ‗All Wise‘ for the wisdom and understanding they need to overcome‖ the 
dangerous problems the world was facing.
77
 Humility and love would yield far better results than 
the pride, fear, and contention that had thus far characterized international policy. 
In May 1939, Paish visited Japan at the request of George Lloyd,one of the senior editors 
of The Statist. His father, Thomas Lloyd, had held the same position when Paish worked there. 
Aside from sightseeing and observing factory conditions, Paish lectured university students and 
the nation‘s leading businessmen on Free Trade. The businessmen also received a printed 
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translation, which was the work of a respected Japanese Member of Parliament. He had wished 
for the opportunity to speak to a military assembly, but this did not materialize.
78
 
 
World War II (1939-1945) 
 
 A few months later, Germany overran Poland, and Britain was again at war. The 
Netherlands and Belgium surrendered in late May, followed by France in June. Hitler turned his 
attention toward Britain, and Paish turned his hopes toward America, scheduling a lecture trip as 
an excuse to go to Canada and America, securing passage on a boat which left in July. A few 
weeks before his departure, he received a letter from Hugh Bullock, the heir to a prominent Wall 
Street banking firm named for his father Calvin Bullock. Hugh gave Paish an idea of what he 
could expect by way of American political opinion. Roosevelt and the Democrats would 
probably be more sympathetic than the isolationist Republicans. Bullock said, ―I earnestly 
believe we are turning over to your people virtually everything by way of materials that is 
available. . . .Nevertheless, I believe new products such as planes, etc., will reach you in ever 
greater number.‖79 Paish apparently deemed the letter important enough to bring it with him to 
America. 
 He got a referral to see Roosevelt from Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, president of 
Columbia University.
80
 Roosevelt agreed to meet with Paish in August 1940.
81
 ―Mr. Roosevelt‘s 
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reception of me exceeded anything I had anticipated. Without any previous statement from me, 
he said: ‗Sir George, I will go fifty-fifty with you. You shall have one half of everything we 
make, whether it be aeroplanes or anything else.‘. . . For me, I was satisfied for I knew Mr. 
Roosevelt would never let us down.‖82 
 Paish then went to the Brookings Institute, where Harold Moulton brought him into 
contact with men of influence. Edward Stettinius met with him first and introduced him to ―the 
heads of practically all the Government Departments.‖83 Paish had lunch with Senator Harry 
Truman the next day. ―We talked together for a long time, and the results were not reassuring to 
me. His chief message was that the Senate was pacifist, and that it would be most undesirable to 
permit the passage of the sixty war vessels that had been given to us to come before it.‖84 Paish 
went on meeting with other senators, but Truman‘s warning soon proved true. 
 Paish‘s meeting with Senator Burt Wheeler of Montana did not go particularly well. 
Paish‘s record of the conversation began with Wheeler saying,  
‗As Germany is not going to attack us, we will certainly not come into the war.‘  
‗Have you ever tried,‘ I asked, ‗to ascertain Germany‘s future intentions?‘  
His answer was curt, ‗No. I have not.‘  
‗Have you ever read ‗Mein Kampf‘?‘ I asked.  
Again – ‗No. I have not.‘  
‗Surely,‘ I said, ‗you must think it worth your while to read it, and find out for yourself 
what Germany‘s intentions are towards the United States.‘  
And for the third time – ‗No. I do not.‘  
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This astonishing conversation with an American Senator, responsible for his country‘s 
foreign policy, almost knocked me out. Half turning away from him, I said: ‗Well, I 
brought America into the first war, and I intend to bring her into this one.‘85 
Wheeler seemed to take this statement as an immediate threat to involve America in Europe‘s 
affairs. He subsequently mentioned his conversation with Paish to the Senate on Monday, 
August 26.  
After its mention in the Senate, the media picked up on Paish‘s remark, causing a certain 
amount of controversy. The story was in the papers for about two weeks, even receiving a short 
article in Time magazine, in which Wheeler stated, ―[Paish] is urging that 50 destroyers be given 
to Great Britain. He is urging that the Johnson Act [forbidding loans to nations which have 
defaulted on their debts to the U.S.] be repealed. He was very, very frank about it.‖ 86 Meanwhile, 
the Times in London was also expressing disapproval of Paish‘s amateur diplomacy, although 
that paper had Wheeler stating that Paish ―qualified [his statement] to the extent of saying ‗Well, 
everything short of war.‘‖87 The Times continued that Paish felt that these statements had 
misrepresented his conversation with Wheeler, as the last statement was the only section the 
papers mentioned, which removed his retort from its context. 
Paish‘s friends understood his intentions and his position as a private citizen, and he 
received letters of support from them. J. Pryse Goodwin, a Wall Street accountant, wrote, 
―Congratulations. That is a wonderful piece of advertising you have pulled off with Senator 
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Wheeler. As a result crowds will flock(?) to your lectures.‖88  Thomas Woodlock, who Paish had 
met on his first visit to America, wrote a letter expressing his distress over the situation. 
Woodlock thought Wheeler ignorant, as ―he does not understand your idiom or background,‖ 
and other Congressmen likewise ―are incapable of understanding what you are talking about.‖89 
The political situation and presidential campaign compounded the problem, ―but it would still, 
probably, have been a difficult and dangerous thing for you to do what you wanted - which was, 
I take it to help our people to understand what the war is about. I know, of course, that you did 
not want to make us belligerents, but merely to show us how deeply concerned we are in the 
issues. But you can never overtake the impression that Wheeler has given the public.‖ 90 The 
problem may have been as simple as the difference between British and American English, but 
Woodlock pointed out that an unreceptive audience would taint whatever Paish had said. 
 Paish left Washington for his son Donald‘s home in upstate New York, where he 
apparently settled in, having no intention of leaving as the British embassy requested.
91
 Instead, 
he decided to try a different tactic – writing out his explanation as clearly as possible, rather than 
depending on conversations that could be misconstrued after the fact. With encouragement from 
Butler, he wrote a short book titled The Defeat of Chaos in the fall of 1940.  
He used the first three chapters to explain the danger that Hitler posed as his message to 
America, devoting the rest of the book to economic subjects for post-war reconstruction.
92
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Perhaps remembering his conversation with Wheeler, Paish opened the book with Hitler‘s 
foreign policy as found in Mein Kampf, that Germany was to ―‗be master of the world.‘‖93 The 
survival of Britain prevented Hitler from bringing the war to the Western Hemisphere, where he 
would have secured Central and South America before turning his attention to the United States. 
The Nazi seizure of gold, securities, and valuables from conquered countries was how Hitler was 
financing his war machine. America‘s stockpile of gold and silver were reason enough for Hitler 
to have the conquest of America as a future goal.
94
 Of course, such a world empire would be 
impossible to maintain from an economic and political standpoint, but even so, Hitler must be 
stopped.
95
 The remaining free world ―must rally to each other‘s support. . .[to] cooperate in the 
task of overcoming a fanatical madman, and a nation that has become mad under the domination 
of a madman. There is no option. Combine or perish must be the warning cry to the peoples of 
every nation.‖96His second chapter was on the British-American alliance – their common 
heritage of freedom and the ability to unite in crisis, but Britain would need more help in the 
days ahead. The British could not protect themselves and the oceans of the world. America might 
need to do more than simply provide aid that stopped short of waging war.
97
 The third chapter 
was a peace plan dependent on the idea that a substantial portion of the German population were 
not Nazis. Rather than repeat the mistakes of Versailles, Paish thought that a change in 
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Germany‘s governing class was in order, and that helping the German people rather than 
punishing them would yield more promising results.
98
 
Paish was making his plea to the American people in a more guarded way, but his 
suggestion that America could not long remain on the sidelines of such a great conflict was 
implicit throughout. He meant this early section ―to convince Congress and the American people 
about the existing danger and to induce them to help.‖99 He sent the first three chapters to 
Roosevelt shortly after completing them, and the book was published in January 1941.
100
 
In 1941, Paish wrote further suggestions to Roosevelt. The Battle of the Atlantic resulted 
in incredible losses of supplies en route to Britain. Paish asked Roosevelt to send supplies in 
American ships. He thought this might be a futile effort, but shortly thereafter, American ships 
were bringing the needed goods to Britain.
101
 After Hitler invaded Russia that summer, Paish 
encouraged Roosevelt to supply the Russians to help them stay in the war, avoiding a repeat of 
their withdrawal from conflict in 1917.
102
 Shortly after America started sending supplies direct to 
Russia, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, and America was finally brought into the war.
103
 Paish had 
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stayed in the country long enough to see his prediction materialize. He returned to England in 
late 1942.
104
 
In 1944, with the end of the war in sight, Paish published a series of articles in The Statist 
which were compiled into a pamphlet titled ―World Restoration.‖ He first discredited self-
proclaimed ―realists‖ who thought the nations would sink back into isolationism by pointing out 
that not all evidence was as obvious as they claimed. Invisible forces such as public opinion 
would have a profound effect on elections and future international policies.
105
  Paish hoped that 
the United Nations and the Atlantic Charter would preserve peace and facilitate rebuilding.  
Additionally, with the United States in it, the United Nations‘ chances of success were 
significantly higher than the League of Nations.
106
 The way that World War II had caught Britain 
unprepared had led to a change in Paish‘s thinking from that of the 1920s. ―The idea that wars 
can be prevented by disarming peaceful nations has proved to be a costly and dangerous 
delusion. Confidence in the future maintenance of peace cannot be created by disarmament . . . 
united and organised strength must be so great that no nation will venture to make war.‖107 The 
nations had come together to defeat the danger from Germany. Paish hoped that cooperation 
would not disband as soon as the war ended, but that a new outlook would bring peace, and that 
peace would bring prosperity to the nations. 
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Before renewed trade was possible, however, immediate needs required the Allies‘ 
attention. Paish had some correspondence with Cordell Hull, Roosevelt‘s Secretary of State.108 
After America entered the war, Hull wrote Paish to ask for suggestions on a course of action 
once the war was over. Paish answered, ―‗We must preserve Germany from starvation because if 
starvation breaks out anywhere it will mean a communist revolution and once started the 
revolution may go round the world.‘‖109 This suggestion, taken with others, may have 
encouraged Hull towards the creation of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration, which provided relief to the civilian populations of war-torn Europe through 
1945-1947.
110
 
 When World War II ended, Paish was nearly seventy-eight. He had spent the previous 
twenty years advocating international cooperation through Free Trade, which was only possible 
through peace.  He hoped that the League of Nations, and later, the United Nations would be 
powerful enough to preserve such dearly won rest from war. Convinced that economic hardship 
and privation led to revolution and war, efforts to prevent those circumstances were of 
paramount importance to him, which was why the Depression had disturbed him so deeply. 
While misunderstood by some politicians and the press, Paish had endeavored to do his part in 
helping policy makers see the big picture – the world economic system that worked beyond their 
individual constituencies – and that by working together, everyone would be not only safer, but 
more prosperous. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
Sir George Paish lived through the defining events of the early twentieth century – World 
War I, the Versailles Peace Conference, the economic rise and fall in the 1920s, the Great 
Depression, and World War II. While observing political and economic developments, Paish 
showed remarkable foresight in understanding the ramifications of government policies. Like the 
strategic game of chess, economics required the ability to account for as many potential 
scenarios as possible, and Paish was a master. 
As an economist, Paish viewed his world through the lens of that discipline. He 
understood that economic laws and government policy affected the life of each person who 
participated in the international market, for good or ill, writing at the end of his life, 
―[Economics] controls our lives with a grip that can never be shaken off, for it is based, 
inexorably, on facts and figures: a deadly combination that produces an unanswerable logic.‖ 1 
Despite the tone of this statement, Paish was not a determinist. Rather, his life testified that 
human action was an important, though often overlooked, economic factor. Economics was more 
than the study of money and numbers, but of choices. According to Jurgen Brauer and Hubert 
Van Tuyll, ―Decision making under constraints is the provenance of economics.‖2  
Paish understood the constraints and tried to help others make the best decisions. His 
works sought to direct human choice to his Free Trade solution, which was why he met with 
policy makers; he hoped to alter events through changing perspectives. His choices and hard 
work had served him well at The Statist. Paish‘s ability to follow the ―unanswerable logic‖ of 
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economics to its conclusions enabled him to see long term policy ramifications before they came 
to fruition. 
For decades, historians have recognized Paish‘s economic contributions as a statistical 
visionary. Long before calculators and computers, he saw the value of keeping careful records in 
the interests of efficiency, better business, and tracking economic health and growth. He pushed 
for reform in railway records, advocating the use of ton mile statistics to businessmen, investors, 
and politicians.  Paish sought to expand the knowledge base of businessmen to equip them to 
improve their industries, and, in turn, the economy as a whole. As an international traveler and 
investment analyst, he attempted to gauge Britain‘s economic strength through statistical study 
long before official records or a standard economic measure existed. His studies on capital 
investment as an indicator of economic health are still cited as authoritative in economic works 
for that period.
3
 These contributions alone merit study and analysis as an important transitional 
stage in economics.  
Paish‘s resourcefulness served him well when given the opportunity to advise Lloyd 
George on financial legislation with far reaching consequences. Having proved his abilities to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer through his estimates on financial growth, Paish heavily influenced 
Lloyd George‘s economic policies after 1910. In this position of trust, Paish was then able to 
give the Chancellor solid advice during the banking crisis at the beginning of World War I. In 
addition to regulating the currency, he helped develop the plans to save London‘s domestic and 
international banks from failing. Lloyd George thanked Paish in a private letter, stating, ―No man 
gave me greater help during the severe financial crisis which followed the outbreak of war   . . . I 
relied more upon your advice than upon that of any of my other advisors, and in every instance 
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your judgment of the outlook was justified by the event.‖4 Paish‘s abilities to process large 
amounts of information and to design plans accordingly suited him for the fast paced nature of 
crisis management, though he could not sustain the pace for the entire war. He had little desire to 
serve in an official capacity after the immediate crisis was over. 
Additionally, Paish facilitated positive relations between America and Britain, first as an 
analyst with respect for the growing American economy, and later as an envoy of the British 
government.  He promoted British investment in America and understood that the American 
economy had a significant role to play in international affairs. During his visit in 1914, Paish 
connected London, Washington, and New York through his colleagues in government and 
business. After his collapse and recovery, Paish advised Lloyd George to seek American aid for 
food in 1917, and America entered the war a few months later. During war time, the Entente 
practiced Free Trade out of necessity, but policy makers did not seem to understand that such 
cooperation could have incredible value after they had secured the peace. 
Before the Versailles Peace Conference ended, Paish understood the arduous task that 
was facing Europe and America. He saw that reparations would cripple recovery before it had a 
chance to begin. Having seen the destruction in France, he knew rebuilding would take many 
years. He observed the suffering of the German civilian population shortly after the war, and his 
initial concerns were in working to alleviate the starving peoples of Europe through charity 
organizations.  Nevertheless, Paish anticipated the problems the Versailles Treaty caused and 
saw the need for reparations reductions years before the Dawes Commission reported. Europe 
needed additional financial help before America could expect payment on war debts.  
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Throughout the 1920s, Paish tracked the rebuilding process, its financial underpinnings, 
and the political tensions left over from the war. The League of Nations failed to become a 
strong body because of America‘s absence, and France‘s dealings with the German Republic 
were fraught with suspicion. Meanwhile, Paish thought America was mishandling the problems 
of credit and repayment by her refusal to accept goods instead of gold. The international market 
was unbalanced, and Britain could not regain equilibrium in her dealings with America or the 
Continent. As America and the European nations drifted into isolationism, the economic strain 
was nearing its breaking point. 
Later in the 1920s, Paish explained the flaws of isolationist economic policy, according 
to his Free Trade philosophy. The haphazard organization of loans, rates of government 
expenditure, and ongoing currency problems deeply worried him. He met with bankers, 
politicians, and intellectuals to explain the true nature of the economic problem – getting to the 
cause rather than simply listing the symptoms. He suggested debt forgiveness as a means of 
restoring purchasing power, to no avail. The cycle of credit was unsustainable, and Paish warned 
that a worldwide crisis was all but inevitable. Throughout this decade in particular, Paish‘s 
prescriptions changed with circumstances as they arose, but always on the basis of economic 
interdependence and cooperation through Free Trade.  
 During the Great Depression, Paish saw the economic crisis deepen as politicians sought 
short term solutions to entrenched problems. He continued to advocate tariff removal as the 
primary means to restore the international market. In his writings, Paish often stated that what 
worked on the individual level also worked at the international level, for merchants and their 
customers or for nations‘ policies with each other. As economic turmoil gave way to 
authoritarian revolutions, Paish noticed with apprehension the growing militarism of Italy and 
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Germany. An ineffectual League of Nations had no power to enforce sanctions when Italy 
invaded Ethiopia, and eventually Hitler stopped upholding any pretense of diplomacy as he 
annexed and invaded territory. Economic and political isolationism was a temporary measure. 
America and England had to stop Hitler. After France fell, Paish met with Roosevelt, who 
offered to help.  By the following year, the Lend Lease program began supplying the British war 
effort. World War II eventually brought America out of the Depression, but Paish had hoped to 
achieve economic cooperation in peace. The Allies only managed to accomplish it through war 
time necessity. 
 After World War II, Paish retired to England. He continued to write after the war on 
currency issues in addition to composing his memoirs. In 1957, he died in a nursing home, just 
six months short of his ninetieth birthday.
5
 He was survived by his five sons, their children, and 
even a few young members of the next generation. Paish‘s descendants continue to prize the 
legacy of their knighted ancestor in the United Kingdom, Canada, America, and New Zealand. 
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